APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat

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Introduction

Specialists at the PT Expert Security Center have been monitoring the Cloud Atlas group since May 2019. According to our data, its attacks have been targeting the government sector of the following countries:

  • Russia
  • Belarus
  • Azerbaijan
  • Turkey
  • Slovenia

The goals of the group are espionage and theft of confidential information.

The group typically uses phishing emails with malicious attachments as the initial vector for their attacks.

In the third quarter of 2022, during our investigation we identified a phishing campaign targeting employees of Russian government agencies. The attackers used targeted mailing based on the professional field of the recipients, even though we found no publicly available information about them.

We first knew about the attackers back in 2014, when Kaspersky researchers published a report. Since then, their tools have not changed much (you can find more about them in the "Malware analysis" section). However, there has not yet been a detailed analysis and description of the functionality of these tools.

In this report, we'll discuss the main techniques of the Cloud Atlas group, and take an in-depth look at the tools they use.

Analysis of the documents found

As in previous years, the group begins its attack by sending phishing emails, using current geopolitical issues that are directly related to the target country as a bait text. An example of an email with malicious content that was sent as part of the campaign in 2022 is shown in Figure 1. Pay special attention to the sender's address: the attackers disguised themselves as the news portal Lenta.ru, well-known in Russia and the CIS. However, email addresses with such a domain can be created with Rambler (Figure 2).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 1. The email
APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 2. A registration window with the @lenta.ru domain name

Most often, the text is taken from the media or from publicly available official documents. Also, for example, in a 2019 attack aimed at Azerbaijan, a text related to the "Indestructible Brotherhood 2019" training exercises in Tajikistan was used, while in the 2020 attacks on organizations in Belarus, the emails contained a text related to the presidential elections.

Figure 3 shows an example of a document which downloads a malicious template (here is a link to the page with the document's contents).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 3. The malicious document

In all cases, the malicious attachment was a document (in either DOC or DOCX format) that implements a Template Injection attack. In such attacks, the document does not contain macros or any other malicious code, and, in most of the observed cases when the DOC format was used, it may not be flagged by static analysis tools such as antiviruses (see Figure 4).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 4. The document with a link to the template is not detected as malicious

The document contains only a link to the template, which is located on a remote server. When the document is opened, the template is automatically downloaded from the remote server.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 5. An example of a template link in Cloud Atlas documents

It's the template that may be malicious, containing a macro or exploit. This download method is a legitimate function of Microsoft Office, but attackers can take advantage of it. For example, the same technique is used by the Gamaredon group in their attacks.

In most cases of a successful connection, an empty document was returned in response. However, in some attacks, we managed to detect the download of a malicious template in the form of an RTF file containing an exploit for the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability.

Researchers at Palo Alto discovered a similar malware delivery chain in 2018. In these attacks, the downloaded RTF templates contained an exploit for the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability, as well as a simple PowerShell backdoor, which was dubbed PowerShower.

We paid special attention to the DOC documents used in this attack: a characteristic feature of all the documents containing a malicious download was a link to malicious content inside the 1Table or 0Table stream (Figure 9, highlighted in green).

After studying the DOC format and comparing malicious documents with regular ones, we found a number of patterns in the infected files.

First, the DOC format requires the 1Table or 0Table stream in any document, along with the mandatory WordDocument stream (Figure 6).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 6. DOC format content

Second, each document contains a special FIB (File Information Block) structure—in Figure 7, the fragment is highlighted in yellow—in which there is a base.fWhichTblStm parameter. Setting this bit to 0 or 1 determines which of the given streams should be used in the document.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 7. An FIB fragment in a document

Figure 8 shows the structure of an FIB taken from the documentation. Particular attention should be paid to the structure highlighted in red. The G bit interests us here the most (highlighted in green). This is the base.fWhichTblStm parameter.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 8. A fragment of an FIB structure

Finally, the last thing that we discovered: links to malicious templates are always located at approximately the same offsets relative to the hex strings in the Table stream. (We were not much interested in the format of the stream itself yet.) In Figure 9, the strings of bytes are shown in yellow and red. Using these, we calculated various malicious template link offsets. This allowed us to quite effectively detect the use of this technique in a specific implementation.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 9. A malicious link inside a Table stream

Attack chain analysis

In the course of our research, we identified several attack chains (Figure 10), which differed in the number of stages required to load the main functionality, as well as the tools used at each stage. Nevertheless, the use of these chains is not new for this group.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 10. Flow chart of the identified attack chains

The first thing we noticed was a remote template downloading an RTF document with an exploit, which in turn downloads and launches an HTA file. An example of the contents is shown in Figure 11.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 11. The contents of the HTA file

An examination of the document and its contents revealed that a vulnerability in Equation Editor was used to launch the exploit payload. The shellcode (highlighted in red in Figure 12) is located inside one of the document's objects and is executed in the context of the EQNEDT32.EXE process.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 12. The encrypted shellcode

The bulk of the shellcode is stored in encrypted form and decrypted after control is transferred to it.

Figure 13 shows the decrypted shellcode, with the first 13 bytes responsible for decrypting the main part of the shellcode (the loop statement is decrypted at the first iteration). For decryption, XOR is used with a two-byte key embedded in the code.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 13. The decrypted shellcode

The direct link to the HTA file (through which the loading is performed) is stored in the body of the shellcode (Figure 14) and is additionally XOR-encrypted with the one-byte value of 0x12.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 14. The link to the malicious HTA file

As seen in Figure 11, the HTA file is designed to create on the disk the VBS scripts with the payload for subsequent stages, as well as an LNK file with the main payload containing the code for loading binary modules. Thus, the main task of the VBS macros (in our case, both macros had similar names: unbroken.vbs and unbroken.vbs.vbs) is to deobfuscate the contents of the LNK file (shown in Figure 15) and transfer control to it, after which the payload which was downloaded by the LNK file code is launched (we will discuss this in the "Malware analysis" section).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 15. The LNK file

It is also worth noting that malicious documents which exploit the same vulnerabilities in Equation Editor and contain identical object names (for example, "weaseoijsd",highlighted in red in Figure 16) in RTF documents were analyzed by Cisco Talos Intelligence specialists and attributed to the Bitter APT group.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 16. The object name in the RTF file

The second chain that we found is downloading malicious PowerShell scripts via remote templates (Figure 17), which in turn download malicious components (mostly Base64-encoded).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 17. The script that loads the payload

We also encountered cases of an intermediate .NET loader that downloaded a payload from a remote server and transferred control to it.

This .NET loader is decoded from Base64 and launched by a PowerShell script (Figure 18).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 18. The script for decoding and launching the necessary export

The export (Figure 19), activated from the loader, takes all the necessary parameters for network communication, including the connection encryption key (highlighted in yellow in Figure 18).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 19. The export activated from the loader

The communication is encrypted with a simple XOR operation with the transferred key (Figure 20).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 20. The encryption of the communication inside the loader

Malware analysis

Initial module

The main task of the initial stage is to decrypt the loader of the main functionality and transfer control to it. We should mention that all such samples that we discovered are quite large and also obfuscated. The loader, in turn, is stored exclusively in the process memory and is not present on the disk at all. The loader is decrypted in parts, via single-byte XOR with different keys (Figure 21). It is also striking that the decryption code is "diluted" with various operations. This is obviously to make searching for and identifying data decryption procedures more complicated.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 21. Partial decryption of the loader

We also noted that almost all of the functions that decrypt the loader contain a large amount of polymorphic code. This performs various operations with strings located inside the image, stack strings, as well as with their individual elements (Figure 22 shows an example). However, these operations do not have any effect on the decrypted data itself. They are used to calculate various variables and constants that affect the decryption parameters (data size, offsets, and so on), as well as to complicate the analysis process. The decrypted data is copied to a pre-allocated memory area as a valid PE image, after which control is transferred to it.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 22. An example of polymorphic code

Main loader

The loader, in turn, is responsible for reading the data from the file containing the main payload, as well as for its decryption and unpacking.

First, the loader decrypts the configuration located in its body. The decryption algorithm (Figure 23) is single-byte XOR with an embedded key. After decryption, the configuration is validated.

We noted that the configuration has not changed since previous studies—it contains the same data and parameters (Figure 23).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 23. Decrypting the loader configuration
APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 24. The loader configuration

Next, the loader reads the file created at the initial stage of the installation, after which it decrypts and unpacks the data contained in it.

It's at this stage where the first differences from earlier samples appear: to hide the payload, AES in CBC mode is used, after which the data is unpacked by LZNT1 (it used to be LZMA).

The unpacking algorithm is rather interesting: the data is unpacked not as a single byte array, but by chunks of various sizes. Figure 25 shows the addition of the header_start_chunk offset to the zero offset of each chunk (for the first of them, an additional offset of 4), after which the unpacking function is activated.

Thus, the structure of the first chunk in the decrypted load can be represented as follows:

struct first_comprChunk { DWORD signature; WORD sizeOfCurrChunk; // in fact compressed buffer size BYTE data[sizeOfCurrChunk]; //compressed data };

Correspondingly, the remaining chunks do not have the first DWORD field and have the following structure:

struct comprChunk { WORD compressedBuffSize; BYTE data[sizeOfCurrChunk]; };

Each chunk is unpacked independently of the others, without any padding, strictly according to the offsets from its headers.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 25. Unpacking the decrypted data

The final stage of the loader involves loading the unpacked data as a valid PE image, searching for the required export by the ordinal name, and transferring control to it (Figure 26).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 26. Overview of the loader functionality

Payload

The data received at the loader stage is the payload of the malware. Its main functionality is to initialize the connection to the control server and load various modules from it.

Curiously enough, the payload module also has a configuration inside which is identical to the one in the loader, but in this case it is AES-encrypted and gets decrypted after control is transferred to the main module.

Next, the malware generates a communication packet that is sent to the server to establish a connection. This packet contains information about the infected machine and is most likely designed to identify targets that are of interest for attackers.

The structure of the packet is shown below (Figure 27).

struct Message { DWORD lenOfPacket; DWORD sizeOf_OSVERSIONINFO; BYTE data_OSVERSIONINFO[sizeOf_OSVERSIONINFO - 4]; DWORD volumeInformation; BYTE timestamp[16]; // GetLocalTime WORD GetUserDefaultLCID; WORD GetSystemDefaultLCID; DWORD len_of_1_field; DWORD len_of_2_field; DWORD len_of_3_field; DWORD len_of_4_field; char username; //1_field char PcName; //2_field char executePath; //3_field char applicationName; //4_field char argvParam; DWORD lenOf_curr currFileSystem; char currFileSystem[lenOf_curr currFileSystem]; };

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 27. An example of a generated packet

The malware sends the generated packet to the control server, using the CLSID_IServerXMLHTTPRequest2 COM object for communication (Figure 28).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 28. The object initialization code

The restored table of this object's virtual methods can be described by the following structure:

 

struct IServerXmlHttpRequest2Vtbl { int QueryInterface; int AddRef; int Release; int GetTypeInfoCount; int GetTypeInfo; int GetIDsOfNames; int Invoke; int open; int setRequestHeader; int getResponseHeader; int getAllResponseHeaders; int send; int abort; int get_status; int get_statusText; int get_responseXML; int get_responseText; int get_responseBody; int get_responseStream; int get_readyState; int put_onreadystatechange; int setTimeouts; int waitForResponse; int getOption; int setOption; int setProxy; int setProxyCredentials; };

It should be noted that the protocol for communicating between the malware and the server supports five types of requests (Figure 29), each of which is used at a certain stage of communication.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 29. Types of requests from the malware to the control server

For example, after a PROPFIND request that installs the directory contents on the remote server, a GET request is made to load the module contained on the control server. Curiously, if the loading is successful, this module is deleted (Figure 30).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 30. A fragment of the communication with the control server

If the communication is successful, binary data is loaded (Figure 31) containing a specific module in obfuscated form.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 31. Loading a module from the server

The same procedures are used for obfuscating the data as for extracting the payload with the loader: AES-CBC encryption and LZNT1 compression.

The functions responsible for the payload extraction procedure, as well as the encryption keys and initialization vectors used to encrypt the communication, are identical to those used to extract the payload in the loader.

In the course of our research, we managed to obtain a sample that the malware downloads from the control server (examples of the server contents are shown in Figures 32 and 33).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 32. The directories on the remote server
APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 33. The file containing the module on the server

The loaded module is decrypted and unpacked (Figure 34), and placed in the memory as a PE image, just as in the case of the loader. It's also worth noting that the ordinal name (which is used to search for the export to call) is identical to the one used to transfer control to the payload.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 34. A fragment of decrypted and unpacked data

The decrypted payload is an executable module, which is preceded by a configuration. Based on the content of the configuration, the main functionality of the loaded module becomes clear: to steal files from an infected computer according to certain parameters.

In particular, attackers are interested in files with these extensions: *.doc, *.docx, *.xls, *.xlsx, *.pdf, *.rtf, *.contact, *.odt, *.jpg, *.jpeg. Accordingly, the paths needed to search for the files are also present in the configuration. These can be both disk names and network paths to remote machines.

Functionality of the loaded module

The first thing that interested us was that the function that transfers control to the code of the loaded module in the first argument (Figure 35) passes a pointer to the function which communicates with the control server.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 35. A code fragment for calling the downloaded module

Analyzing this function allowed us to understand that in this case the communication scheme is identical to the one described above: data is transferred by function calls from the table of virtual methods of the same COM object (in this case, PUT is used as the communication method).

Other than this, the analysis of the loaded module reveals nothing of interest. It simply performs a recursive search in the directories of certain paths.

It's worth noting that for each type of disk connected to the computer, a different type of search is used (Figure 36). It is also possible to steal files from remote servers—in this case, usernames and passwords (stored in the malware configuration) are transferred as parameters.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 36. Different types of search implemented in the malware

Let's also have a look at the function responsible for analyzing the contents of the scanned directories (Figure 37). It's worth noting that the function itself does not read the file directly. Instead, the pointer to the read function (pfnReadFile in the figure) is transferred through the global context—the structure that is initialized at the initial stage of the application—and the function is called this way.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 37. The function for searching files in a directory

Network infrastructure

All the domains that we discovered in the 2019–2021 attacks were registered through the anonymous registrar bitdomain[.]biz. This resource guarantees complete anonymity and payment on the service is made exclusively in bitcoins.

After analyzing the SOA records of the domains, we found that the admin email address field contains perfectly normal email addresses. In some cases, they turned out to be the registrant addresses that we found in WHOIS. Therefore, in those domains where WHOIS was hidden by the privacy settings, it can be assumed that the email in the SOA is the email of the registrant.

 

Domain

email

mynewtemplate.com

adam_s92@protonmail.com

new-template.com

piterjesten@protonmail.com

upgrade-office.com

p.borovin@protonmail.com

upgrade-office.org

pavel.savin1992@bk.ru

msofficeupdate.org

g.j.dodson@protonmail.com

officeupgrade.org

alex.sval@tutanota.com

newoffice-template.com

j.konnoban@email.cz

template-new.com

e.darmanin@inbox.lv

 

When analyzing the 2022 campaign, we found a pattern: all the control servers registered by the attackers are used only to load remote templates.

List of the detected servers:

  • checklicensekey.com
  • comparelicense.com
  • driver-updated.com
  • sync-firewall.com
  • system-logs.com
  • technology-requests.net
  • translate-news.net

We also discovered an interesting fact: the attackers disguised one of the control servers (technology-requests.net), trying to make it look like the site https://www.hoosierheightsindianapolis.com (Figure 38).

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 38. The legitimate site

Figure 39 shows what the malicious site looked like on July 26, according to webcache.googleusercontent.com.

APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat
Figure 39. The site from which the malicious content was downloaded

The malicious tools communicate through a cloud service (similar to previous years), namely OpenDrive (https://www.opendrive.com). The service is used for both storing the malware modules to be loaded and for loading the collected data. In this case, a temporary mailbox is used for logins.

Conclusion

The Cloud Atlas group has been active for many years, carefully thinking through every aspect of their attacks. The group's toolkit has not changed for years—they try to hide their malware from researchers by using one-time payload requests and validating them. The group avoids network and file attack detection tools by using legitimate cloud storage and well-documented software features, in particular in Microsoft Office.

The attackers also carefully choose their victims and target their attacks: the group used targeted mailings based on the professional field of the recipients, but we noted the absence of any publicly available information about the recipients, which could indicate a well-prepared attack.

We predict that the group will continue to operate, increasing the complexity of its tools and attack techniques due to the fact that it has once again attracted the attention of researchers.

Authors: Denis Kuvshinov, Aleksandr Grigorian, Daniil Koloskov, Positive Technologies

The article's authors thank the incident response and threat intelligence teams PT Expert Security Center for their help in drafting the story.

Detection of CloudAtlas group activity by Positive Technologies products

MP SIEM

The following correlation rules analyze triggered processes and help identify the described activity:

  • Suspicious_Connection
  • Malicious_Office_Document
  • Windows_Autorun_Modification

The following correlation rules analyze the triggered scripts and help detect the described activity:

  • Execute_Malicious_Powershell_Cmdlet
  • Execute_Malicious_Command

Implementation of D3FEND techniques in MP SIEM, which will help in detecting CloudAtlas grouping activity

D3FEND ID

Name of technique D3FEND

Description

D3-PA

Process Analysis

CloudAtlas group activity can be identified through the rules of process analysis.

D3-SEA

Script Execution Analysis

CloudAtlas group activity can be detected through the analysis rules of the launched scripts.

 

PT NAD

PT NAD contains a CloudAtlas reputation list, which will help in identifying CloudAtlas grouping activity.

Implementation of D3FEND techniques in PT NAD, which will help in detecting CloudAtlas activity.

D3FEND ID

Name of technique D3FEND

Description

D3-DNSTA

DNS Traffic Analysis

Using reputation lists to detect Cloud Atlas group activity

D3-FC

File Carving

Extracting from traffic the files downloaded by the Cloud Atlas group

 

PT Sandbox

PT Sandbox verdicts on CloudAtlas grouping activity:

  • Trojan.Win32.Generic.a
  • Trojan.Win32.RegLOLBins.a
  • Backdoor.Win32.CloudAtlas.a
  • Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Generic.a

Network traffic analysis rules to help detect CloudAtlas grouping activity:

  • LOADER [PTsecurity] Possible CloudAtlas
  • SUSPICIOUS [PTsecurity] PROPFIND method in http request
  • SUSPICIOUS [PTsecurity] MKCOL method in http request

Yara-rules, which will help in detecting CloudAtlas grouping activity:

  • PTESC_tool_win_ZZ_OfficeTemplate__Downloader__DOC
  • PTESC_exploit_win_ZZ_MalDoc__CVE201711882__Rtf__CA

Implementation of D3FEND techniques in PT Sandbox, which will help in detecting CloudAtlas grouping activity

D3FEND ID

Name of technique D3FEND

Description

D3-PA

Process Analysis

Analysis of the behavior of processes created by malicious applications of the Cloud Atlas group

D3-FA

File Analysis

Analysis of Cloud Atlas group files to determine their status and functionality

D3-NTA

Network Traffic Analysis

CloudAtlas activity can be detected through traffic analysis

 

Yara

rule PTESC_tool_win_ZZ_OfficeTemplate__Downloader__DOC { strings: $a = {00 A5 06 6E 04 B4} $b = {FF FF FF 7F FF FF FF 7F} $c = {B4 00 B4 00 81 81 12 30 00} $pref_1 = {68 00 74 00 74 00 70 00 3A 00 2F 00 2F} $pref_2 = {68 00 74 00 74 00 70 00 73 00 3A 00 2F 00 2F} condition: uint16be ( 0 ) == 0xd0cf and ( for any i in ( 300 .. 400 ) : ( uint8be ( @a + i ) == 0x68 and uint8be ( @a + i + 2 ) == 0x74 and uint8be ( @a + i + 4 ) == 0x74 and uint8be ( @a + i + 6 ) == 0x70 ) or for any j in ( 100 .. 200 ) : ( uint8be ( @b + j ) == 0x68 and uint8be ( @b + j + 2 ) == 0x74 and uint8be ( @b + j + 4 ) == 0x74 and uint8be ( @b + j + 6 ) == 0x70 ) or for any k in ( 200 .. 400 ) : ( uint8be ( @c + k ) == 0x68 and uint8be ( @c + k + 2 ) == 0x74 and uint8be ( @c + k + 4 ) == 0x74 and uint8be ( @c + k + 6 ) == 0x70 ) ) and ( ( for any l in ( 14 .. 70 ) : ( uint8be ( @pref_1 + l ) == 0x2f ) ) or ( for any y in ( 16 .. 70 ) : ( uint8be ( @pref_2 + y ) == 0x2f ) ) ) }
rule PTESC_exploit_win_ZZ_MalDoc__CVE201711882__Rtf__CA { strings: $equation = "4571756174696F6E" nocase ascii //180000004571756174696F6E $msftedit = "generator Msftedit 6.39.15" nocase ascii //generator Msftedit 6.39.15.1401 $objclass = "objclass weaseoijsd" nocase ascii condition: uint32be ( 0 ) == 0x7B5C7274 and ($equation and ($msftedit or $objclass) or (for any i in (50..350) : (uint8be (@equation + i) == 0x64 and uint8be (@equation + i + 2) == 0x64 and uint8be (@equation + i + 4) == 0x64 and uint8be (@equation + i + 6) == 0x38))) }

IOCs

File indicators

 

Name

SHA-256

MD5

SHA-1

Методические рекомендации для грузоотправителей-грузополучателей (2022).doc (Guidelines for consignors-consignees (2022).doc)

f2c4281e4d6c11173493b759adfb0eb798ce46650076e7633cf086b6d59fdb98

b3f55d9065dd51a8be2d6c5078866086

9f4a18adaa094eef06ef88e76b6f4ed777f677e7

Будьте_бдительны_Корпоративное_уведомление.doc (Stay_alert_Corporate_Notice.doc)

482aeb3db436e8d531b2746a513fe9a96407cf4458405680a49605e136858ec5

3399deafaa6b91e8c19d767935ae0908

b745032dd5cd6f7eba2187fa3c86c775953a5611

Иранские оценки визита В. Путина в Тегеран.doc (Iranian assessments of V. Putin's visit to Tehran.doc)

2f97374c76ae10c642a57a8b13d25cbdc070c9098c951ea418d1533ac01dc23c

61b6e2040d5815d0135b2850137828d9

df80df54f94d56aa436cdc2713e3bc8160ce43f8

Почему исламский мир не дает Западу изолировать Россию.doc (Why the Islamic world does not allow the West to isolate Russia.doc)

3cf2bda35e88c59bb89e7fdc8fcfd4c46b2b9186e61325d2924e049d775b741f

2b5cec8715e92d87bf6992e003a5651c

9fc804b58ab43fc5f453810a30ea311fc3f5cbe6

leptophis[1].doc

c0e154b10d70b99b5616a2eda6bfe188a49f85ed3aa92d48ec9ce709df9d563f

470c1df23bd825c6e36e1cd5936db912

ba9fc2f0d9f0fcf726a2cbc426f570bea5f22c96

lep[1].hta

a4194555b19ea32680cc23f8f7d42da02b82eba8b64cb5f4630110f4e2c1ddf3

66ecc2285e9d172ceb9f0b0ba030c65c

b5cc0a7ff0d8cd151545cbabcaf23c5486acec95

unbroken.vbs

59066dc428cde7cc55f3c24c2658d3e288f3f072811d86243a85af14bd482744

7ce01fc92fc221cad338cea1cfd43a22

9579b7f3a98657f704575aa4a08ed6ff3d8680a4

unbroken.vbs.vbs

4cb6e224b6b03a2f6ac1ac23e6bf097067018b90493ee94f210f66fbbbbdce77

1aa04f847bd7ec987986ec6e52966b89

8e23ac686bbc958dd85e46a2d4bb6acaee5aa35f

list.ps1

2233c0d4030cc728c2219b1e9c4c05cb262e2ddc7f4ac2f2924767396418c25a

d5a40e2986efd4a182bf564084533763

89364b9d170ab90d25d30649582679c3d7332b91

office.ps1

7fcf7c1dad362283d0a27993df4764e2bbb11857842b80f63d63449b9f2f1fa4

d02ab337bc56214d72b8cabea8bc19b2

81e22a16a6617670c394dbd7ee642eba8e419de7

office.ps1

d9fc6504c8970fefc441c77965937c382b029f1278918d1f54d196859e9f6e7c

077b71298ce31832ae43e834b7e6c080

ee50f3cd04d0fdf5e931ad85bfd464828116279b

rtcpsvc.dll

3e7b066c26ba98d285a41043c739be8767606d9df057ee2f7bcddb7862c00711

f68e64dacd046289d4222098ee421478

ce13a1ae0dd5d537320b77ac8e3d94df6448a82a

lockrail.dll

c5d1de206445f508c1af5f213e46b915b536e4b36ef917c4e826a982dd47c312

acbbc6fea0dbbe7cba511b450cc2b758

94f342f9219cee4f2b91b54809de92d5bb00e93e

holeincorner

8215e918ca3a77424dadac1aebc9a44b8f9840cd1389df0399a9fa4eb6329775

dc3faa6840d1b5fd296d71ee8877254e

53b767ff4fa5c5adc7041389ffd28bb4abda1434

Salzgitters.avi

b8dc70b9ffe06c9ecaf0216ea7948fe718143db10641a23297652693ea026ab3

e5e19040beabb0c0c68fdf4f3978a18b

e68dc027aee851125960ee0559610f43fee581b0

Schultes.wmv

f4e710f515249e8c08ae76284bfb280070e1fd2308e9d9321d92163dfc73be66

45f6f95918efbdcc2c97e3d905635f83

9a1d8a68042b91ee17648606e43907354227d25f

 

Network indicators:

  • api-help.com
  • driver-updated.com
  • sync-firewall.com
  • system-logs.com
  • technology-requests.net
  • translate-news.net
  • checklicensekey.com
  • comparelicense.com
  • msupdatecheck.com
  • protocol-list.com

Payload filenames (from the configuration):

  • callicrates
  • tinh
  • amianthium
  • mandarinduck
  • cushioning
  • kingsclover

Email addresses from which malicious emails were sent:

 

MITRE TTPs

ID

Name

Description

Resource Development

T1583

Acquire Infrastructure

The Cloud Atlas group used servers to store remote templates, as well as cloud storage as a control server

T1585

Establish Accounts

The Cloud Atlas group registered cloud service accounts and tempmail mailboxes

Initial Access

T1566.001

Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The Cloud Atlas group sent phishing emails with malicious content

Execution

T1204.002

User Execution: Malicious File

The Cloud Atlas group sent emails with malicious DOC and DOCX files

T1559.001

Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model

The Cloud Atlas group used COM components in their tools

T1059.001

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The Cloud Atlas group used PowerShell scripts to load and run their components

T1059.005

Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The Cloud Atlas group used Visual Basic scripts to load and run their components

T1203

Exploitation for Client Execution

The Cloud Atlas group used vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office components to launch their malicious components

Persistence

T1547.001

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

The Cloud Atlas group used registry keys (autorun) for persistence

Defense Evasion

T1221

Template Injection

The Cloud Atlas group used a remote template injection technique to hide the malicious payload

T1140

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The Cloud Atlas group encrypts its components to protect them from discovery and analysis

Collection

T1025

Data from Removable Media

The Cloud Atlas group used tools to collect information from various remote devices

T1039

Data from Network Shared Drive

The Cloud Atlas group used tools to collect information from various network devices

T1005

Data from Local System

The Cloud Atlas group used tools to collect information from the file system

T1560.002

Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library

The Cloud Atlas group applies LZNT1 compression to collected data using the WinAPI library

T1560.003

Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method

The Cloud Atlas group used custom data encryption algorithms

T1119

Automated Collection

The Cloud Atlas group used methods of automatic data collection from infected machines

Command and Control (C2)

T1573.001

Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

The Cloud Atlas group used AES encryption to hide network communication

T1041

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

The Cloud Atlas group used a C2 channel to transfer collected data

T1102

Web Service

The Cloud Atlas group used the OpenDrive cloud service as a control server

 

General TTP countermeasures used by CloudAtlas

Basic protective measures

D3FEND ID

Name of technique D3FEND

Description

D3-SYSVA

System Vulnerability Assessment

Since CloudAtlas exploits vulnerabilities, it is necessary to monitor the vulnerability of systems in the infrastructure and update vulnerable software in a timely manner

D3-SU

Software Update

Since CloudAtlas exploits vulnerabilities, it is necessary to monitor the vulnerability of systems in the infrastructure and update vulnerable software in a timely manner

D3-OTF

Outbound Traffic Filtering

Restrict network traffic to untrusted servers from IOC lists

D3-DNSDL

DNS Denylisting

Block resolution of DNS names from IOC lists

 

Additional protective measures

D3FEND ID

Name of technique D3FEND

Description

D3-SRA

Sender Reputation Analysis

CloudAtlas group uses free email services, so as an additional measure of protection against phishing, you can specially mark emails from external free services to attract additional attention of the user

D3-UDTA

User Data Transfer Analysis

CloudAtlas grouping downloads data through compromised workstations, so you can use profiling of the amount of data transferred to the Internet by the user to detect anomalies in the case of massive data exfiltration

 

原文始发于ptsecurity:APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat

版权声明:admin 发表于 2022年12月12日 上午11:16。
转载请注明:APT Cloud Atlas: Unbroken Threat | CTF导航

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