Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

逆向病毒分析 1年前 (2022) admin
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Cyble has recently published an analysis of AXLocker ransomware, a new ransomware that has been seen for the first time in november this month.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

As the article explains, the ransomware encrypts and exfiltrates data using discord. In this report we will focus on the encryption routine of this new artifact, which we can see in its “EncryptionFile” method.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

First, it obtains a string stored in the variable “password” (“WnZr4u7xh60A2W4Rzt”) which is hashed using the SHA256 algorithm.

c889bdf9d6ba1d89aa7b99043f2e78d923158ff245b664d247be26840b97bd2a

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

Using this password and a “salt” initialized to the first 8 bytes, the program derives a 256-bit key that it will use to encrypt the files with AES-256.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

When ransomware uses this type of symmetric encryption, it usually generates a random password or “salt” that it sends to the C2 before encryption. This way the attackers are the only ones who know the key used for encryption.

Since this is the AES-256 algorithm in CBC mode, it will also require a 128-bit initialization vector (IV) that performs an XOR operation with the first block.Therefore, the key we will derive will be 384 bits (256 bits for the key + 128 bits for the IV).

In this case, since the password and “salt” values are static, the same key and IV will always be generated.

Parameter Value
Key fe40b8abd47c8537c4eb31b7df43bab36b94e728e546cdddbfb5cbed3c42dd3b
IV f3822d39a4daac3a7e99ebae045a735f
Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

To check that it works properly, let’s perform a small proof of concept. For the test, we are going to use the following file “test.txt”

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

When the ransomware is executed, the content of the file looks like this.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families
Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

Finally, if we use the above key and IV, we can easily decrypt the file.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

Performing an active search in public sources, we have found several .NET samples that use the same “insecure” encryption method. These samples belong to the following ransomware families:

Ransomware Families
A.E.S.R.T
Clownic
ElevateRansom
CBTL
GetFu**ed
SLAM

Comparing the samples we noticed that GetF**ed and Clownic share an identical “Main()” function. Which is quite similar to the AXLocker main function.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families
Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families
Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

This “Main()” matches the main function of hiden-tear, the first ransomware that was released as open-source in August 2015 by Uktu Sen. The code is publicly available on github and can be easily modified.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

Hiden-tear has specific functions to create a random password and send it to a C2 controlled by the attacker. However, these families do not seem to have the necessary infrastructure to be able to implement this and have opted to leave the password hardcoded in the binary.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

On the other hand, ElevateRansom, A.E.S.R.T, SLAM and CBTL share very similar “Start()” functions that perform almost the same functions.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families
Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families
Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families
Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

These ransomwares have more capabilities than the previous ones by deleting shadow copies, the backup catalog and disabling the widows security mode. These capabilities match those provided by the Chaos builder ransomware also based on hiden-tear, so these three groups may have based some of their logic on that builder.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families

Therefore, since all samples are hiden-tear based and none use random password generation it is not difficult to extract the decryption keys from each of the samples.

Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families
AXLocker (D9793C24290599662ADC4C9CBA98A192207D9C5A18360F3A642BD9C07EF70D57)
(526CD1C6EE4B4982C8A066B0FBB8DD044CBD0AAC0D6C57E3A9BC45B3BCC857BB)
(9E95FCF79FAC246EBB5DED254449126B7DD9AB7C26BC3238814EAFB1B61FFD7A)
(0225A30270E5361E410453D4FB0501EB759612F6048AD43591B559D835720224)
(C8E3C547E22AE37F9EEB37A1EFD28DE2BAE0BFAE67CE3798DA9592F8579D433C)
(D51297C4525A9CE3127500059DE3596417D031916EB9A52B737A62FB159F61E0)
Key fe40b8abd47c8537c4eb31b7df43bab36b94e728e546cdddbfb5cbed3c42dd3b
IV f3822d39a4daac3a7e99ebae045a735f
A.E.S.R.T (D9793C24290599662ADC4C9CBA98A192207D9C5A18360F3A642BD9C07EF70D57)
(B6743906C49C1C7A36439A46DE9ACA88B6CD40F52AF128B215F808A406A69598)
Key f2cfbe63e05e75d032907ae1d81be238258b30f6750e670bdc48a514c49d5ad4
IV cf22c4c22ccdfadee8c04408d9a138d4
ElevateRansom (B8B35F465A99F2E8C39A7A52F2AF76F68BD8E779AA0D4E705DCAA2BE595D888E)
Key b397841165e0d1dff42cd33a6a9b12b1293e5927d446fcc3feb1682e452c8c22
IV 898d4c9ecda3e75bb6774c6c2d310078
Clownic (880823DD9DF0CA6047CD829A1031E8A167CCEC0629FDEAC40A097DD555DEBF7C)
Key 891184dd507c7ef5cfac4063de071a61adf2d70be155a12ea7cb818047fe9197
IV 50f6e27b9f5624ca748deef2522ba6c5
CBTL (E387A1CC1A8694DC77D325A9ADBC9B6F6650FE50B51896EC06A7030110912879)
(ECBA870ABA49FC6CD149409497B911C78CE46BD1CE7C1696F0AD00EE80844F50)
Key a2dbd73e6ace22288271a3f032717b6d2e7822aefec8b7cf1dfc2b54195a9c20
IV 60a0b9d4b110def1ad008a8eba27cae6
GetF**ed (66120938887B4D13ABEE307E24FE6D05261B21DEDE4170D2FE15011574DB8313)
Key bd2bd815911fcd889ac1c4bce10ee9edb82196dd0bb10ee4de6c0c3bf0e37e40
IV 2f80ec8edb3884bf3759741351fb9448
SLAM (59B922E65C5EEF564A75B278A41B10B437D408C3BCD9D62956A98B932FF22E16)
Key 4c42d7dbea281b3b31cfbf33130133f66fd8667ff38abc37f78feff913c8a35b
IV 27d78cf02f64a3a607199c490d5e3674

As these are emerging groups and relatively new samples, all indications are that the operators behind the ransomware are testing their artifacts. It is interesting to have them located in these early iterations in order to be able to observe their evolution.

Customers with Lab52’s APT intelligence private feed service already have more tools and means of detection for this campaign.
In case of having threat hunting service or being client of S2Grupo CERT, this intelligence has already been applied.

If you need more information about Lab52’s private APT intelligence feed service, you can contact us through the following link

 

版权声明:admin 发表于 2022年12月2日 下午7:52。
转载请注明:Analyzing the encryption method of emerging ransomware families | CTF导航

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